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MITCHELL-LAMA BUYOUTS: POLICY
ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES
David J. Sweet & John D. Hack*
I. Introduction
The Mitchell-Lama law, Article II of New York State's Private
Housing Finance Law, ' is one of the nation's pioneering programs for
the development of middle-income housing.2 Originally enacted in
1955, 3 the program offers state and municipal assistance to private
developers in the form of long-term, low-interest mortgages4 and real
* David J. Sweet, a member of the firm of Walter, Conston, Alexander & Green,
P.C., is a former counsel to the New York State Assembly Committee on Housing. John
D. Hack, an associate of the firm, is a former Associate Counsel to the New York State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal.
1. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 10-37 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989). Enacted
by 1961 N.Y. LAWS chs. 803-04, the Private Housing Finance Law collects various pro-
grams relating to state and local assistance for housing developed by non-governmental
entities which were previously contained in the Public Housing Law or had been enacted
as separate, unconsolidated laws. The principal sponsors of Mitchell-Lama were Senator
MacNeil Mitchell and Assemblyman Alfred A. Lama. Walsh, Mitchell-Lama Dissolu-
tion: A Conflict of Law and Politics, 16 N.Y. ST. B.A. REAL PROP. L. SEC. NEWSL. 11,
15 n.3 (No. 3, July 1988) [hereinafter Walsh].
2. At one time, the Mitchell-Lama law served as a source of large-scale housing
production. It produced a broad range of housing: massive developments such as Co-op
City in the Bronx and Starrett City in Brooklyn, projects ranging from single buildings to
large superblocks on numerous urban renewal sites, as well as privately-owned land, and
such notable later developments as the Roosevelt Island housing. See infra note 15.
3. See 1955 N.Y. Laws 407.
4. The statute authorizes a maximum loan term of 50 years. See N.Y. PRIv. Hous.
FIN. LAW § 26(2) (McKinney 1976). These loans were initially made directly by the
state or municipality. Id. § 22(2) (state loans); id. § 23 (municipal loans). Later, the
legislature created public agencies to do the job: the New York State Housing Finance
Agency in 1960 (1960 N.Y. Laws 671 (codified as amended at N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN.
LAW §§ 40-61 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989)), and the New York City Housing Devel-
opment Corporation in 1971 (1971 N.Y. Laws 551 (codified as amended at N.Y. PRIV.
Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 650-70 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989)). The New York State Ur-
ban Development Corporation (see 1968 N.Y. Laws 174, §§ 1, 5(17)) and the Battery
Park City Authority (see N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1974(14) (McKinney 1976)) are also
authorized to make loans to housing companies incorporated under the Mitchell-Lama
program. These agencies were created to get around obstacles that limited the use of
direct government loans. At the state level, virtually all direct debt must be approved in a
voter referendum. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 11. At the local level, competition for such
money by other agencies pressed cities' debt limits.
In each case, the owner of the project pays debt service essentially equal to the agency's
cost of funds plus the provision of any necessary reserves. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW
§ 26(2) (McKinney 1976) provides for repayment of principal "in annual installments
equal to the amount payable by the state on the moneys borrowed for the project ...
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estate tax exemptions.5 In return for such governmental assistance,
the owners of rental projects must limit their profit and rent levels.6
Similar assistance is available to cooperative projects, conditioned on
the regulation of the apartments' purchase price and monthly carry-
ing charges.' In either case, the projects are owned by special statu-
tory corporations known as limited profit housing companies.' The
apartments are available to renters or co-op owners whose income
does not exceed specified levels, based on a multiple of the rent or
maintenance costs.9
[plus interest at] the same rate of interest paid or to be paid by the state for the definitive
housing bonds issued on account of such loan." Id. Thus, the benefits of both the credit
rating of the government and the tax-exempt status of the public bonds issued to raise
mortgage money are passed through to the project. These benefits significantly reduce
monthly maintenance charges and rents. This is so particularly because these projects
were built, even more so than housing generally, with borrowed funds. The law autho-
rizes 95% financing in most cases, with loans up to the full project cost permitted to
certain forms of non-profit sponsors. Id. §§ 22(2), 23(1).
5. Real estate tax exemptions are granted on a local option basis. In practice, if a
locality does not grant an exemption, the builder does not go through with building a
project. The current state authorizing legislation permits real estate taxes to be reduced
to a level equal to 10% of shelter rent-defined as the rent, excluding any portion attribu-
table to gas, electricity or other utility costs. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 33(l)(a)
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989). Until 1989, the law authorized tax exemptions for the
period of the project mortgage, but in no event for longer than 30 years. Id. In the case
of projects refinanced in response to the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, with federal mort-
gage insurance, the tax exemption lasts for the life of the refinanced loan. Id. § 33(1)(d).
The statute was amended in 1989 to remove the 30 year limit and permit tax exemptions
for the term, not only of the original government loans, but also of any future refinancing
"approved by the [c]ommissioner or the supervising agency." 1989 N.Y. Laws 229,
amending PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 33(1)(a), (1)(c), (4). This would appear to author-
ize the indefinite continuation of tax benefits, so long as any mortgage is outstanding.
Although the ultimate classification of a project as "state" or "municipal" depends on
the source of the mortgage, the real estate tax exemption is granted by the locality. Thus,
if a project withdraws and surrenders its subsidies, it is the locality which will take in
greater taxes, not the state.
6. In most cases, the owners of a Mitchell-Lama project are limited to a 6% annual
return on their equity. Id. § 28(1). The rents that may be charged are set by the New
York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) or by a municipal
agency. Essentially, the rent is to be set at a level so as to cover expenses, reserves, and
the statutory return on equity. Id. §§ 31, 2. Projects financed by state agencies are super-
vised by the DHCR. See id. § 2(6). Municipal projects are regulated by the applicable
municipal agency. In New York City, for example, the Department of Housing Preserva-
tion and Development (HPD)-under general supervision of the DHCR-is the supervi-
sory agency. Id. § 2(15). If a project receives neither a state nor a municipal Mitchell-
Lama loan, but only a property tax exemption, it is classified as "municipally assisted."
Id. § 2(17).
7. N.Y. PRiv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 31 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989) (carrying
charges calculated by same formula as for rentals); Id. § 31-a (limits on resale prices of
apartments).
8. Id. § 11.
9. The basic income limits are seven times the annual rent, rising to eight times the
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The Mitchell-Lama statute also allows Mitchell-Lama project own-
ers to withdraw from the program by prepaying or "buying out" the
government mortgage that financed the project. Specifically, the stat-
ute permits project owners to pay off their mortgages prior to the ma-
turity date, after the project has been occupied for twenty years.1"
Upon such prepayment, the owner must also give up the tax exemp-
tion; however, the project then ceases to be subject to the Mitchell-
Lama limitation on rents and profits. " Consequently, the project is
subject only to whatever general rent regulations, if any, exist in the
local community, and a rental project may be converted to a coopera-
tive or condominium under the same requirements as other local
rental housing. Depending on a project's condition and location,
Mitchell-Lama owners could make a substantial profit if they exer-
cised the statute's buyout right.' 2 In fact, a number of development
owners have already withdrawn from the program',' and others are in
the process of doing so.' 4 Tens of thousands of apartments are eligi-
rent for families with three or more dependents. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 31(2)(a)
(McKinney 1976). Various exclusions from income permitted under the statute and reg-
ulations make this formula-already more liberal than the rent/income ratio provisions
in most housing programs--even less restrictive. Furthermore, tenants whose incomes
are up to 25% above those set by the formula are still eligible, provided they pay addi-
tional rent based on the rent surcharge formulas applicable to tenants whose incomes rise
above the limits after admission. Id. § 31(2)(d). See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1989, at
A19, col. 2.
10. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 35(2) (McKinney 1976). Because most of the
construction occurred in the early years of the program, a large portion of the Mitchell-
Lama stock is now at or near the 20-year point at which buyouts are permitted. See infra
note 15. A few projects have already exercised the right to withdraw from the program,
or are in the process of doing so. Tens of thousands of additional units will reach this
point in the next few years. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
11. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 35(3) (McKinney 1976).
12. The impact of the right to invoke the buyout provision will vary greatly based on
a project's location. In many areas, where the housing market may not yield great re-
turns from a deregulated project, the owner will want to keep the subsidy and accept the
governmental regulation. In other areas, giving up governmental aid would be a small
price to pay compared with the profits to be made by converting a rental project into a
cooperative or condominium.
13. As of early 1989, 5,328 units in Mitchell-Lama projects had been lost to the pro-
gram because of owner buyouts. Another 2,988 units in New York City were in the
process of buying out. MEMORANDUM, GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL No. 30. See also
CITIZEN'S HOUSING AND PLANNING COMMISSION, 48 COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC POLICY
MEMORANDUM 1-2 (Jan. 1989) [hereinafter CHPC MEMORANDUM] (citing slightly
lower figures). The majority of projects which have either bought out or have filed notice
of intent to buy out are rental projects. Id. at 5-10. These are statewide figures. Approx-
imately 135,000 of the state's 165,000 units are within New York City. N.Y. Times, July
6, 1988, at B3, col. 1. See infra note 15 for a summary of the status of those projects.
14. Under the city and state regulations, a fairly lengthy procedure is required before
a project may actually become deregulated. For a discussion of these regulations, see
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ble to join them or will become eligible over the next few years.' 5
Exercise of the buyout privilege can produce two related results,
both of which raise controversial public policy questions.' 6 First, a
Mitchell-Lama owner can reap a potentially great profit from what
was intended to be a government program for middle-income hous-
ing. 7 Second, middle-income tenants who live in buildings which
infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text. These regulations lead to a "pipeline" of
projects on route to completing their buyouts.
15. Statistics compiled by the Citizen's Housing and Planning Council (CHPC) from
city and state records show that projects containing a total of approximately 76,000
apartments had passed the 20-year point as of the end of 1988 and accordingly were
eligible for buyouts. The number of eligible apartments will increase to over 91,000 by
the end of 1992. CHPC MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 5.
The CHPC statistics indicate the number of state-regulated and city-regulated develop-
ments that become eligible for buyouts annually. These statistics show how the growth of
the buyout issue in the last few years tracks the history of the program-an initial spurt
in project completions in the mid-1960s, followed by a slight lull, followed by a second
round of extensive development in the early 1970s. For a chronological summary of
Mitchell-Lama activity, project by project, in both the city and the state programs, see id.
at 5-10.
The sharp growth in the number of apartments (as distinguished from the number of
projects) theoretically available for buyouts is accounted for in part by a few very large
cooperatives, chiefly developed by the United Housing Foundation and other non-profit
housing groups in the 1960s. More than 15,000 apartments in Co-op City in the Bronx
joined the buyout-eligible list in 1988, accounting for most of that year's jump in the
cumulative total. Other major developments in this category include Rochdale Village
in Queens, with nearly 6,000 apartments, and Warbasse Houses in Brooklyn, with ap-
proximately 2,600 apartments. These projects, located chiefly in outlying areas and fre-
quently developed and tenanted by groups with strong ties to labor unions, are not likely
candidates for Mitchell-Lama buyouts.
The true test of the present buyout formula, as it applies to cooperatives, will come
with Southbridge Towers, which will reach its 20th anniversary at the end of 1990. This
1,651-unit project is located just south of the Manhattan approaches to the Brooklyn
Bridge, adjacent to both the City Hall area and New York City's financial district. At the
time of construction, this project's site was essentially a non-residential area. However,
nearby downtown areas now form a luxury housing market, characterized by the Battery
Park City development and various luxury loft conversions. The Southbridge apart-
ments would command high prices in today's housing market.
16. This is the latest, and perhaps most fundamental, of a series of controversies that
have arisen over the history of the program. They have included disputes over the dis-
placement of tenants that resulted from project development, the treatment of project
tenants whose income exceeded that of the program's target group, the inability of some
projects to make required payments on their government mortgage loans, and the racial
composition of certain projects. Recently, a sharp controversy developed over the occu-
pancy of apartments by only one or two persons. The New York City administration has
sought to encourage and, as a last resort, compel tenants of these "under-occupied" units
to move to smaller apartments, thus making available the family-sized apartments. The
mandatory aspects of the program were sharply criticized. The Koch administration,
faced with proposed city council legislation to outlaw mandatory transfers, abandoned
the effort. For a statement of the Koch administration's position, see N.Y. Times, March
13, 1989, at A19, col. 2.
17. See N.Y. Times, July 6, 1988, at B3, col. 1.
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have been "bought out" may be forced to move out because of in-
creased rent or maintenance costs.'" Even if present tenants are pro-
tected, apartments which become vacant will no longer be set aside
for middle-income tenants, further aggravating the shortage of afford-
able housing in many urban communities.' 9 Because of these contro-
versies, the New York legislature has been considering proposals to
revoke or substantially limit an owner's buyout right.2" Such amend-
ments, however, raise significant issues of constitutional law and pub-
lic policy. 2'
Because Mitchell-Lama housing consists of both rental projects and
cooperatives, the buyout issue involves at least three different private
interest groups: rental project owners, rental tenants, and cooperative
apartment owners. Furthermore, because Mitchell-Lama is a govern-
ment program intended to provide affordable housing, the buyout is-
sue also involves the interests of the general public.
If the buyouts proceed as present law permits, the owners of rental
projects may be able to charge higher rents than they otherwise could
have under the Mitchell-Lama regulations,22 or to make substantial
profits on a cooperative conversion of the property. Mitchell-Lama
rental tenants, however, will face uncertain housing prospects and
possible rent increases.
In Mitchell-Lama cooperatives, this clash of interests has a further
twist. As in any cooperative, the project tenants are also the owners.
Because of governmental assistance, the initial purchase price for such
apartments was substantially lower than the market price for
equivalent apartments. Mitchell-Lama's resale price regulations, how-
ever, essentially prohibit a departing tenant-shareholder from making
a profit, thus forcing the tenant-shareholder to pass on the benefit of
the low purchase price to the next owner.23 In some neighborhoods,
cooperative units not regulated by Mitchell-Lama would command
extremely high prices in today's market. Thus, although some coop-
erative residents may be content to continue receiving the Mitchell-
Lama benefit of low monthly maintenance charges, others may desire
18. See Walsh, supra note 1, at 15 n.6.
19. See id. See also CHPC MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 1.
20. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
21. Id. See also infra notes 119-86 and accompanying text.
22. Subsequent rent levels will depend on whether there exist more specific statutes
pertaining to a particular geographical area. See infra notes 74-101 and accompanying
text.
23. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 31-a (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1989) essentially
provides that a seller may recover only what he initially paid for the cooperative apart-
ment plus that part of maintenance that was used for amortization of the building's mort-
gage plus any money paid for capital improvements.
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the prospect of far greater benefits from deregulation. In the context
of cooperatives, therefore, the Mitchell-Lama buyout issue may pit
shareholder against shareholder-in other words, neighbor against
neighbor.24
Government officials view the affordable housing provided by
Mitchell-Lama projects as a scarce resource that should be pre-
served.25 If the buyout provision is not amended, New York State
(and especially New York City) faces the loss of a portion of the hous-
ing stock set aside for middle-income tenants. Such a loss would
come at a time when the costs of creating new units have escalated
dramatically and federal housing assistance has been sharply cur-
tailed.26 As a means of postponing a depletion of New York's middle
income housing units, the administrations of Governor Cuomo and
Mayor Koch favor an extension of the twenty-year buyout waiting
period to thirty-five years.27
Part II of this Article discusses the history of the buyout provision
and its effect on Mitchell-Lama rental and cooperative projects. Part
III analyzes the constitutional issues raised by potential legislative
modification of the buyout provision. Part IV discusses the policy
issues involved in allowing Mitchell-Lama buyouts. Part V draws on
these policy considerations and outlines the various factors which
should govern the development of a solution to the buyout dilemma.
This Article concludes with recommendations for legislative action-
including provisions for appropriate incentives for keeping projects
within the program-to protect the interests of project owners, ten-
24. Such a conflict recently arose in a large cooperative project developed under an-
other middle income housing program. The residents of Penn South Houses in Manhat-
tan rejected the opportunity to take their cooperative project private, even though its
location in Manhattan's Chelsea neighborhood would command far higher prices than
would Bronx projects like Co-op City. This project was built under the Redevelopment
Companies Law (RCL) and operates under somewhat different rules, but has a tenant
population similar to that of the Mitchell-Lama projects. For a discussion of RCL, see
infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
25. See N.Y. Times, March 13, 1989 at B3, col. 1.
26. From a purely short-run budgetary standpoint, as distinguished from a housing
point of view, New York City and other local governments also stand to gain from
Mitchell-Lama buyouts. They would gain a significant increase in revenues as Mitchell-
Lama projects now enjoying substantial real estate tax exemptions leave the Mitchell-
Lama program and become fully taxpaying. See N.Y. Times, March 13, 1989, at A19,
col. 1 ("[s]ince the start of this program ... the city has forgiven almost $2.5 billion in
property and business taxes [and in 1987] forgave over more than $100 million in taxes
for these buildings"). As noted earlier, a buyout would entail surrender of tax benefits for
the future, but not a repayment of those extended in the past.
27. See N.Y. Times, March 13, 1989, at A19 col. 1.
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ants, and those concerned with the preservation of the affordable
housing stock.
II. The Mitchell-Lama Program and the Buyout Provision
A. History of the Buyout Provision
1. Pre-1959 Law
As first enacted, the Mitchell-Lama law made mortgage prepay-
ment difficult, if not impossible. A Mitchell-Lama housing company
could be dissolved and removed from regulation only if the following
three conditions were met: (1) the consent of the state or municipal
regulatory agency involved, (2) expiration of thirty-five years from the
occupancy date,28 and (3) repayment to the municipality of a sum
equal to the total of all tax benefits which the project had received. 9
Thus, dissolution was an involved and potentially profitless endeavor.
If project owners met these three conditions, a project could be
transferred from the Mitchell-Lama company to the company's own-
ers30 or sold to new owners. 3' Alternatively, the Mitchell-Lama com-
pany itself could be "reconstituted pursuant to appropriate laws
relating to the formation and conduct of corporations ... ," i.e., its
certificate of incorporation could be amended so as to convert it into
an ordinary unregulated business corporation.32
These provisions were added to the original Mitchell-Lama law one
year after its enactment 33 and still apply to pre-1959 Mitchell-Lama
projects.34
28. The occupancy date is
the date defined in the contract between a company and a municipality or the
state, as the case may be, as the date upon which the project is to be deemed
ready for occupancy, or if such term is not defined in such contract, the date of
issuance of the temporary certificate of occupancy.
N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 12(3) (McKinney 1976).
29. Id. § 35(1).
30. Id. § 35(3).
31. Id. § 36(1). With respect to a sale to a different owner under this section, rather
than "voluntary dissolution" under § 35, the law (1) prohibited such sale prior to 35
years from the occupancy date except to another Mitchell-Lama company, (2) provided
that upon such sale both the benefits and the burdens of the Mitchell-Lama program
would follow the project, and (3) permitted the selling company (now an empty shell) to
be dissolved with governmental consent. Id. Upon dissolution, "the stockholders of the
dissolving company shall in no event receive more than the par value of their stock with
accrued and unpaid dividends upon such stock." Id. at § 36(2).
32. Id. § 35(3).
33. 1956 N.Y. Laws 877, §§ 322-323.
34. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 35(1), 35(3), 36 (McKinney 1976).
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2. The 1959 and 1960 Amendments: The Buyout Provisions
In 1959, after the original Mitchell-Lama law failed to produce a
significant number of middle-income housing projects," the New
York legislature added the initial buyout provision.36 This provision
gave the owner of a Mitchell-Lama project the option of dissolving
the housing company on or after the fifteenth anniversary of the occu-
pancy date.37 Consent of the regulatory agency was not required for
such dissolution, but the new provision continued to require the
owner to pay off the government mortgage and surrender the project's
future tax exemptions.38 Unlike the original law, however, the 1959
amendment did not require the owner to repay the tax benefits previ-
ously received.
The 1959 buyout provision was part of then Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller's bill to encourage private-sector participation in the crea-
tion of middle-income housing.39 To that end, the bill also included
provisions which both broadened the right of investors to participate
jointly and made Mitchell-Lama projects lawful investments for cer-
tain fiduciaries.40
The buyout provision was amended in 196041 to increase the mini-
mum period before which an owner could withdraw a project from
fifteen to twenty years. 42 The 1960 amendment also extended the
buyout privilege to municipally-assisted as well as to state-assisted
projects.43
3. Legislative History of the Buyout Provision
The legislative history of the 1959 and 1960 amendments contains
little discussion of the buyout provision. In a memorandum approv-
ing the 1959 bill, however, Governor Rockefeller noted that the bill
carried out his proposals for "an all-out program of collaboration
among [s]tate government, local government and private enterprise"
to develop middle-income housing.44 Among several changes
35. By May 1, 1959, project owners had begun work on only nine cooperative and
four rental projects. See Walsh, supra note 1, at 15 n.6.
36. 1959 N.Y. Laws 675.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Walsh, supra note 1, at 13.
40. 1959 N.Y. Laws 675, §§ 1, 2, 5.
41. 1960 N.Y. Laws 669.
42. Id.
43. See N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 35(2) (McKinney 1976).
44. Message of the Governor, Middle Income Housing Loans, 1959 N.Y. Laws at
1764.
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"designed to make this collaboration possible," the memorandum re-
ferred to the "opportunity for the transfer of new housing to private
ownership after fifteen years."45
The only mention of the buyout provision in the Governor's bill
jacket 6 appeared in a letter from one of New York City's leading
civic groups in the housing field, the Citizens Housing and Planning
Council (CHPC)" The CHPC letter sharply attacked the buyout
provision as giving an unjustified possibility of extra profit to develop-
ers, who would already be receiving significant subsidies under the
program.48 Further, CHPC alleged, because this extra profit would
be available only upon leaving the program, the buyout provision cre,
ated an incentive to withdraw housing from the Mitchell-Lama pro-
gram.49 The CHPC letter argued that this change was unnecessary to
draw private capital into the program."
The legislative history of the 1960 amendment is even less illumi-
nating. This amendment appeared in a bill principally devoted to
making the existing Mitchell-Lama law reflect the creation of the
New York State Housing Finance Agency (HFA). 1 This bill was
part of the Division of Housing and Community Renewal's (DHCR)
legislative program. 52 That agency's memorandum in the Governor's
bill jacket mentioned the buyout provision only in passing; specifi-
cally, it noted that a fifteen-year prepayment period could result in
raising the costs of the state borrowing used to finance the Mitchell-
Lama loan, while a twenty-year term would reduce this potential
problem." 3
45. Id.
46. A "bill jacket" is the executive chamber's file on a bill sent to it by the legislature.
The bill jacket includes both the documents setting out the legislative actions and all
comments received by the governor's office on whether the bill should be signed or not.
The governor's office routinely solicits comments on pending bills from a wide variety of
organizations.
47. Letter from Roger Starr, Executive Director of Citizens Housing and Planning
Council, to Hon. Roswell B. Perkins, Counsel to the Governor, at 7-9 (Apr. 9, 1959) (in
bill jacket for 1959 N.Y. Laws 675).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The HFA was created by 1960 N.Y. Laws 671 (codified as amended at N.Y.
PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 40-61 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989)).
52. See Walsh, supra note 1, at 11-13.
53. The extension to 20 years "will serve to lessen the increased interest rate and
premium [on the debt used to finance the state or HFA loans to the housing company]
resulting from the 15-year privilege." Memorandum of State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal at 17 (Apr. 8, 1960) (in bill jacket for 1960 N.Y. Laws 669).
19891
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
B. Procedures for Withdrawal from Mitchell-Lama
In 1987, faced with the initial group of Mitchell-Lama buyouts,54
New York State and New York City issued regulations55 governing
withdrawal from the program. These regulations provide for notice
and review of a proposed buyout before it takes effect.56 The DHCR
regulations are intended to "assure full disclosure in advance to all
residents and to the public ... to effect a smooth transition... and to
assure that all required actions to be taken on the part of the housing
company have been complied with prior to the dissolution thereof. 5 7
Thus, although the agency did not assert any right to prevent a
buyout which meets the statutory criteria, it established a fairly elabo-
rate procedure for withdrawal.
At least 180 days before the proposed reorganization, a project
owner must submit a "notice of intent" to the DHCR, accompanied
by detailed information regarding the present and proposed future
status of the project.5" When the agency has received all of the re-
quired documentation, it then authorizes the owner to proceed to the
next step, a public information meeting. Notice of this meeting must
be given not only to tenants, but also to various public officials, in-
cluding the state legislators within whose district the project is lo-
cated. 9 Other regulations ensure transition of Mitchell-Lama rental
tenants to rent stabilization at the last rent under Mitchell-Lama, °
notice to the local taxing jurisdictions to assure termination of the tax
exemption upon reorganization, and payment of various fees owing
under the program.6'
The process ends with the issuance of a certificate by the DHCR to
the Secretary of State (with whom any corporate dissolution papers
would have to be filed) that all legal prerequisites have been met and
that the DHCR "has no objection" to dissolution. This language,
however, does not purport to confer power on the DHCR to reject an
application which meets the statutory criteria. Indeed, the regula-
tions specifically state that the DHCR "shall" issue the certificate if
54. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
55. The state regulations, promulgated by DHCR in July 1987 as temporary emer-
gency measures, became permanent in September 1987. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 9, § 1750 (1988). Thereafter, HPD issued essentially similar regulations.
56. Id.
57. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 1750.1 (1988).
58. Id. § 1750.3.
59. Id. §§ 1750.4-.5.
60. Id. § 1750.8. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
61. Id. § 1750.15.
[Vol. XVII
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all of the prescribed steps are completed.62
The basic provisions of the Mitchell-Lama buyout regulations ap-
ply to both rental and cooperative projects. There are, however, spe-
cial requirements for cooperative buyouts. These additional
requirements include: (1) advance approval by the shareholders of the
expense of carrying out the preliminary steps toward dissolution; (2)
the Attorney General's acceptance of an offering plan before final
DHCR approval; and (3) approval of the dissolution by a two-thirds
shareholder vote.63
The state and city procedural regulations have been the subject of
at least two reported court decisions. In Winthrop Gardens v. Eimick
[sic], 64 the owners of Mitchell-Lama rental projects unsuccessfully
challenged the right of DHCR to promulgate these regulations. 65 The
court upheld the regulations, stating that they did not interfere with
the absolute right to withdraw from the program,' because they "do
not permit the DHCR to disapprove a prepayment plan or prevent a
dissolution on public interest grounds."' 66 Consequently, although in
some cases dissolution may be delayed, the regulations did not exceed
the Commissioner's powers.67
More recently, in 2250 Olinville Avenue, Inc. v. Crotty,6 s the court
62. Id. § 1750.14. Project owners must pay a "buyout fee" of between $2,500 and
$5,000, depending on the number of apartments in the project. Id. § 1750.13. Specific
provisions make it clear that the owners must absorb all of the costs of the transaction,
including this fee, and cannot pass them on to the tenants or to any project fund. "Id.
§ 1750.13(d).
63. Id. § 1750.7-.13(d).
64. No. 1185, slip op. (Sup. Ct., Albany County, Feb. 22, 1988).
65. Id. at 55-57. The presiding judge, Justice Vincent G. Bradley, upheld the regula-
tions in all respects, pointing to the detailed regulatory authority of DHCR over Mitch-
ell-Lama housing.
66. Id. at 56. The owners argued that the Mitchell-Lama law grants them an absolute
right to withdraw from the program after 20 years without regulatory approval. Id. at
52. Justice Bradley responded that the regulations "do not interfere with this right [be-
cause they] do not permit the DHCR to disapprove a prepayment plan or prevent a
dissolution on public interest grounds," but merely impose procedural requirements. Id.
at 56. The court further observed "that in all but a few cases, dissolution will not even be
delayed." Id.
67. See id. The owners affected filed a notice of appeal from Justice Bradley's deci-
sion to the Appellate Division. Before the appeal could be heard, however, the owner
achieved a buyout under the challenged regulations, rendering the case moot. Since the
regulations simply make the buyouts slower and more complex, but ultimately do not
prevent them, appellate-level decisions may not be forthcoming in future challenges. Cf.
Orrego v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. I11. 1988), dealing with similar tempo-
rary hurdles to withdrawal from certain federal housing programs. These burdens were
imposed by an act of Congress rather than an administrative regulation. See infra notes
201-03 and accompanying text.
68. 141 Misc. 2d 238, 532 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
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ruled against the attempt of the New York City Department of Hous-
ing Preservation and Development (HPD) to apply its buyout regula-
tions retroactively to Mitchell-Lama projects whose owners had
applied to prepay their government loans prior to the effective date of
the regulations.69 HPD argued that it had delayed processing these
applications because new regulations were about to be issued. The
court ruled that the regulations could not be applied retroactively and
that therefore the Mitchell-Lama owners whose applications were al-
ready pending had the right to proceed with an action alleging viola-
tion of the contract contained in their loan documents.7 °
C. Effect of the Buyout Provision on Rental and Cooperative
Projects
Under the Mitchell-Lama law, a project owner, upon compliance
with the conditions of the statute, has an absolute right to remove the
project from the program.7' While the loan documents entered into
by the housing company vary in their treatment of the owner's right,72
the statute requires the agency supervising the loans to approve
buyout applications that meet the statutory criteria. 73 Beyond this
69. Id.
70. 2250 Olinville Ave., Inc. v. Crotty, 141 Misc. 2d 238, 532 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct.
1988). The validity of the regulations was not at issue in Olinville. Justice Saxe suggested
that he probably would uphold the regulations, but found that, in any event, they could
not be applied retroactively:
[w]hile this contractual right to repay the mortgage may be procedurally altered
by municipal regulation . . . there was no such alteration in effect when the
respondents refused to accept prepayment .... The notes therefore constituted
binding and valid contracts with the city, the terms of which were in no way
abrogated by regulation when plaintiffs applied to prepay their mortgages.
Id. at 240, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
It should be noted that Justice Saxe found the "contract" solely in the loan documents
themselves, and found no occasion to analyze, or even mention, the question of whether
the statutory right to prepay was itself a contract between the government and the devel-
oper. For a discussion of the constitutional contract clause issue, see infra notes 122-52
and accompanying text.
71. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 35(2) (McKinney 1976). See also supra notes 27-
43 and accompanying text.
72. For example, HFA loan documents prohibit prepayment before 20 years but do
not grant or deny the right to prepay the mortgage thereafter. Urban Development Cor-
poration (UDC) regulatory agreements generally provide for continued regulation of the
project for a period of 20 years or as long as the UDC mortgage is outstanding, whichever
is longer; the mortgages themselves prohibit prepayment without consent of the UDC.
The loan documents for municipally-aided projects similarly prohibit prepayment unless
the regulatory agency consents.
73. Since the mortgages and regulatory agreements are contracts, one might argue
that the Mitchell-Lama owner, by signing an agreement not to prepay without the mort-
gagee's consent, has provided the state or city with an independent legal basis for keeping
a project in the program. But this contention is contrary to the plain meaning of the
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threshold question, however, the effect of the Mitchell-Lama with-
drawal provisions on rental as opposed to cooperative projects differs
so dramatically that the two must be treated separately, even though
this segment of the statute does not draw such a distinction.
1. Rental Projects
a. Rent Stabilization
i. Application of Rent Stabilization
Upon removal from the Mitchell-Lama program, a rental project
located in New York City74 immediately becomes subject to rent sta-
bilization.75 Although this conclusion has been challenged by the real
estate industry and may eventually have to be resolved by the courts,
it follows directly from the language of the Emergency Tenant Protec-
statute. The law provides that Mitchell-Lama companies funded after 1959 "may volun-
tarily be dissolved, without the consent of the commissioner or supervising agency" after
20 years. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 35(2) (McKinney 1976). The provision was
presumably written in this fashion to contrast with the earlier terms of the law which
permit dissolution after 35 years "with the consent" of the regulatory agency. Id. § 35
(1).
DHCR or HPD surely could not, by regulation, give itself the power to prohibit a
buyout; the statute explicitly denies the agencies that power. It is extremely unlikely that
the courts would permit the state or city, acting in its capacity as mortgagee, and placing
this restriction in a note or mortgage rather than a rule or regulation, to thereby reach the
prohibited result. Accordingly, the "consent" clause in the mortgage should be read so
as to permit mortgagees to impose only requirements that relate to procedural matters
such as the manner in which the buyout is to be arranged and the fees to be charged.
This right does not include the power to reject the prepayment application "on the
merits."
74. A similar result would follow for a Mitchell-Lama project in one of the suburban
counties (Nassau, Westchester and Rockland) covered by the ETPA, provided that the
project is within the class of housing upon which the municipality had already imposed
rent regulation under the Act. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8624(a) (McKinney 1987). In
suburban communities the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) is a self-contained
rent law. In New York City, it operates "indirectly" as an amendment to the Rent Stabi-
lization Law (RSL), which was enacted in 1969. Thus, most rent-stabilization-related
provisions enacted in 1974 and subsequently (including the major changes made by the
Omnibus Housing Act of 1983) appear twice: in the ETPA with respect to the suburbs
and in the RSL with respect to the city.
The RSL, like New York City's rent control law, is still a part of the city's administra-
tive code. The power to amend the RSL, however, resides almost exclusively in Albany
with the state legislature. Finally, the entire administrative code was recodified by Chap-
ter 907 of the Laws of 1985. The rent control and rent stabilization laws, formerly Titles
Y and YY of Chapter 51, are now Chapter 3 (§ 26-401 to 26-415) and Chapter 4 (§ 26-
501 to 26-520) of Title 26.
75. Generally speaking, rent stabilization sets percentage limits by which the rent in
stabilized apartments can be raised each time a tenant signs a new lease. It also provides
for a set increase following a vacancy. Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8621-34 (McKinney 1987) [hereinafter ETPA].
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tion Act (ETPA): The ETPA regulates all housing not explicitly ex-
empted by the statute, and Mitchell-Lama projects are among the
classes of housing explicitly exempted.76 The specific exemption ap-
plies to housing "in which rentals are fixed by or subject to the super-
vision of" another government agency." Once a Mitchell-Lama
project is removed from the program through a buyout, it falls outside
of the exempted category and consequently is subject to ETPA
regulations..
Any contrary argument which concludes that upon removal from
the Mitchell-Lama program, a New York City rental project does not
become subject to rent stabilization, requires reading the ETPA ex-
emption to exclude housing whose rents not only "are" but were at
any time in the past supervised by a public agency.78 In other words,
exemption status would be determined once and for all as of the time
the ETPA took effect (when the municipality made its "declaration of
emergency") 9 and would then be unaffected by any later changes.
However, any such reading of the ETPA is inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the provisions relating to the exemption of housing subject to
regulation by other government entities,8 ° as well as with the well-
76. The ETPA rent stabilization exemptions are set out in the New York City Ad-
ministrative Code § 26-504 (a) and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act, N.Y. UNCON-
SOL. LAW § 8625(a) (McKinney 1987). The introductory clause of the latter provision
includes "all or any class or classes of housing accommodations in a municipality," but
excepts certain other classes.
77. The rent stabilization exemption that applies to Mitchell-Lama housing is for
housing "in which rentals are fixed by or subject to the supervision of the [S]tate
[D]ivision of [H]ousing and [C]ommunity [R]enewal under other provisions of law or the
New York [C]ity [D]epartment of [H]ousing [P]reservation and [Djevelopment or the
New York [S]tate [U]rban [D]evelopment [C]orporation." N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW
§ 8625(a)(3) (McKinney 1987). This provision covers Mitchell-Lama companies as well
as several other forms of regulated housing. The original Rent Stabilization Law con-
tained a similar exclusion for housing "owned or leased by, or financed by loans from, a
public agency or public benefit corporation." NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-
504(a)(1)(a) (1986). This exclusion was somewhat more limited, since it applied only to
publicly-funded housing and not to the somewhat broader class of publicly-regulated
housing. Thus the original provision, standing alone, would not exclude from rent stabi-
lization a project which received assistance only in the form of real estate tax benefits.
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8625(a)(3) (McKinney 1987).
78. By its nature, the question will only arise at the point at which withdrawal from
the Mitchell-Lama regulation has been accomplished, the precise point at which, apply-
ing the statutory language quoted supra note 77, the rents are no longer "fixed by or
subject to the supervision of the DHCR or HPD." N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8625(a)(3)
(McKinney 1987).
79. Under the ETPA, a municipality may declare an emergency and afford rent regu-
lation to all buildings not already subject to rent stabilization. See N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAW § 8621 (McKinney 1987).
80. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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established interpretation of analogous clauses relating to rent con-
trolled apartments and publicly owned buildings.
Unlike certain other exemptions under the ETPA,8' the exemption
of Mitchell-Lama projects from rent stabilization is not intended to
encourage or deter certain landlord actions; rather, it is in the statute
only because the Mitchell-Lama rents are already regulated, and addi-
tional rent regulation is not needed and would prove unworkable.
Therefore, if a Mitchell-Lama project is no longer subject to' the
Mitchell-Lama law, the only reason for the exemption from rent sta-
bilization no longer exists.
The provisions of the ETPA pertaining to rent controlled apart-
ments are analogous to those pertaining to Mitchell-Lama housing.
The relevant provisions state that "housing accommodations subject
to" the rent control laws are not covered by the ETPA.82 Here again,
coverage is not required because such units are already regulated.
Rent controlled apartments become rent stabilized when vacant, since
at that point the exemption is no longer in operation, i.e., the apart-
ment is no longer "subject to" rent control.8 3 This result has never
been the subject of dispute, and thus, the legislature did not consider
it necessary to state in the statute that the exemption ended upon such
change in status. Applying the same reading to a precisely similar
clause of the ETPA, a Mitchell-Lama project's exemption from rent
regulation will end after that project loses its Mitchell-Lama status.
Another example of a clause analogous to the Mitchell-Lama stat-
ute is the exemption for publicly-owned buildings.84 This provision
contains no language explicitly stating that the exemption ends if the
81. Certain ETPA exemptions must be read as fixing a building's status under the law
once and for all, in order to prevent the operation of the provision from undermining
established housing policy. For example, buildings with fewer than six units are exempt
from rent stabilization. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8625(a)(4)(a) (1987); NEW YORK,
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504(a) (1986). But alterations adding a sixth apartment to a 5-
unit building do not end the building's exemption. See 126 East 56th St. Corp. v. Harri-
son, 122 Misc. 2d 799, 473 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1984). A contrary result would penal-
ize an owner for creating new housing units. Similarly, reducing the apartment count
below six by combining units does not lead to deregulation. This would reward elimina-
tion of an apartment, as well as penalize the tenants in occupancy.
82. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8625(a)(1) (McKinney 1987).
83. Establishment of this system was perhaps the most significant feature of and mo-
tive for enacting the ETPA. In New York City this provision recaptured units that had
been removed from rent control prior to 1974 and moved units still subject to control to
stabilization as they become vacant. Notably, however, the ETPA in its list of exemp-
tions did not explicitly provide that the exemption for rent-controlled apartments ceased
upon vacancy. The exemption was acknowledged by all parties as operating only while
the apartment'remained rent controlled. If this had not been the universal understanding
of the language, a specific provision to this effect would have been deemed necessary.
84. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8625(a)(2) (McKinney 1987).
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building goes into private hands."5 Yet there has never been any
doubt that a city-owned residential property sold to a private owner is
subject to rent stabilization. The exemption has always been under-
stood to operate only so long as its conditions are met.86 Likewise,
there is no reason to read the ETPA as extending the exemption for
Mitchell-Lama housing once the conditions of the exemption are no
longer met.
ii. Initial Rent Level
Assuming that a deregulated Mitchell-Lama rental project is sub-
ject to rent stabilization, an appropriate rent level must be set. Rent
stabilization sets an "initial legal regulated rent,"8 " which is generally
the rent level set in the prior lease.88 Thus, in the case of a project
withdrawing from the Mitchell-Lama program, the immediately pre-
ceding rent (i.e., the last Mitchell-Lama rent) becomes the "initial
legal regulated rent."8 9 Subsequent adjustments are available only in
certain circumstances specifically noted in the rent stabilization law.90
Any other formulation of the initial stabilized rent level9' would
require an independent statutory basis. For example, in the case of
apartments moving from rent control to rent stabilization, the law
allows "the rent agreed to by the landlord and the [new] tenant" to be
the basis for the stabilized rent.92 This right of the owner is subject to
the tenant's right to seek a rollback to an administratively determined
"comparable" rent.93
85. Id.
86. Indeed, the only question has been what the initial stabilized rent would be. This
issue was dealt with by local legislation, which preserved the rent schedules which had
been "restructured" by the city while it owned the building. As a result rents would not
revert to the level (often far lower) charged before the city took over the building. NEW
YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-507 (1986) (as added by Local Law No. 14 of 1979).
In the course of the debate over this rent restructuring issue, there was never any doubt
on the part of any party that the apartments became regulated under the ETPA upon sale
to a private owner.
87. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8626(a); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-512(b).
88. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8626(b)(2). The statute provides that the initial stabi-
lized rent is "the rent reserved in the last effective lease." Id. See also NEW YORK, N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE § 26-512(b)(3).
89. Id. See also Walsh, supra note 1, at 12.
90. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8626(d). For example, a change in services provided to
the tenant would be grounds for a rent adjustment. Id. § 8626(d)(1).
91. For example, another formulation might consist of allowing the owner to set an
open market rent for the first new lease, or permitting the regulatory agency to fix some
intermediate point between the old rent under Mitchell-Lama and a market rent.
92. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8626(b)(1); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-
512(b)(2).
93. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8629(b); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-513.
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The statute governing rent stabilization explicitly states, however,
that for apartments "other than those described," i.e., other than
those which are specifically permitted a new rent level, the rent from
the last effective lease forms the basis for the new rent.94 Thus, there is
no legal basis for restructuring rents upon transfer of a Mitchell-Lama
project to stabilized status.9" In its Rent Stabilization Code, the
DHCR has explicitly incorporated this result.96
iii. Treatment of Surcharges
The Mitchell-Lama law requires that tenants whose income exceeds
the limit for a particular project must pay surcharges, above the nor-
mal rent set for the project.97 The rent laws make no provision for the
treatment of such "extra" rent.98 The legislature's silence, however, is
hardly surprising, because surcharges based on income are peculiar to
government-assisted programs for persons of prescribed income
levels. It is unlikely that such surcharges were within the contempla-
tion of legislators drafting a rent law for private-sector housing.
If the rent under the last effective lease prior to the buyout is the
basis for the stabilized rent, these surcharges should be included in the
The determination of comparability is based in part on guidelines issued by the Rent
Guidelines Board.
94. See NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-512(b)(3). See also N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAW § 8626(b)(2) ("all other housing accomodations").
95. The statute does provide for adjustment of the initial rent on application of either
tenant or owner "upon a finding that the presence of unique or peculiar circumstances
materially affecting the initial legal regulated rent has resulted in a rent which is substan-
tially different from the rents generally prevailing in the same area for substantially simi-
lar housing accommodations." N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8629(a); NEW YORK, N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE § 26-513(a). This provision, however, addresses situations in which the
normal rent formulas do not make sense when applied to an individual apartment. For
example, an apartment previously occupied by a relative of the owner or by a building
employee might be totally or nearly rent-free. Basing all future adjustments on this
"rent" would be irrational.
The Mitchell-Lama situation, however "unique or peculiar," entails the relationship
between two separate, complex regulatory systems-the Mitchell-Lama program and the
Rent Stabilization Law. The "unique or peculiar" clause cannot be stretched to permit
an agency to restructure rents as a way of reconciling these systems.
96. DHCR Commissioner's Advisory Opinion No. 1 of 1986, incorporated into the
Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2521.1(1) (1988).
97. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 31(3) (McKinney 1976). The surcharges are ap-
proximately proportional to the percentage by which the tenant's income exceeds the
maximum, but are limited by statute to 50% of the base rent to which they are added. In
theory, tenants who are more than 50% over-income face eviction, but the sanction is
never invoked.
98. There is no mention of surcharges in the ETPA. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§§ 8621-8634 (McKinney 1987).
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new rent.99 The DHCR has adopted this approach in its regula-
tions.' °° In addition to the statutory basis for this result, it should be
noted that excluding surcharges would reduce the rent for the high-
est-income tenants in the project while keeping other rents un-
changed-hardly an equitable result.' °1
b. Conversion of Rental Projects to Cooperatives
The preceding discussion suggests that the rent levels of a Mitchell-
Lama project located in New York City or any other community with
rent stabilization do not change significantly when the project leaves
the program. The project, however, would face major cost increases
resulting from surrender of its two subsidies-the favorable mortgage
and the tax exemption. These costs, at least in the short run, would
be absorbed by the owners of the projects. °2
99. Although it is not stated as a rental figure in the lease, the rent including the
surcharge would in fact be the last rent being paid when the apartment came under the
system. Thus, including the surcharge as a part of the rent base is consistent with the
statutory language. I
100. The applicable section of the Rent Stabilization Code sets the initial stabilized
rent at "the rent charged to and paid by the tenant in occupancy on the date such regula-
tion. [under the Mitchell-Lama law] ends." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. REGS. tit. 9,
§ 2521.1(1) (1988).
101. As a result, initial rents would vary with tenant income at the time of conversion.
In the future, however, this relationship would not be preserved. This result is unavoida-
ble, given the nature of the rent laws. Except for the rent increase exemptions for eld-
erly and disabled tenants with very low incomes, rent control and rent stabilization
provide for neither income reporting nor for keying rents to ability to pay. Although this
type of initial rental structure would be unusual in purely private housing, it does not
pose a substantial problem. The skewing of the rents would presumably be no greater
than that which often occurs under the rent laws based solely on accidents of history such
as how many times the apartment has changed occupants.
102. There is no provision in the Rent Stabilization Law for passing on landlord cost
increases of a particular building to rental tenants, other than those associated with in-
creases in services or so-called "major capital improvements." However, some costs may
be passed on by way of a rent adjustment that compensates for increased owner costs
under the "hardship" provison, which takes two forms. The hardship provision origi-
nally in the RSL operated by comparing the return to the owner for the last three years
with that in 1968-1970. It granted the same percentage rate of return on costs as was
being earned when the building entered the system. See former NEW YORK, N.Y. AD-
MIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(6) (1978), as enacted as part of the original Rent Stabilization
Law by New York City Local Law No. 16 of 1969. When the fuel crisis and other
inflationary trends of the 1970s produced a situation in which this formula would yield
sharply higher profits, the law was amended to provide only for a preservation of approxi-
mately the same net dollar return. 1975 N.Y. Laws 392, amending NEW YORK, N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(c)(6).
This scheme, coupled with the decline in the value of the dollar, the increase in financ-
ing costs, and the decreasing relevance of a base date at the end of the 1960s, led to major
industry pressure for a new formula. The addition of an alternative hardship provision
was one of the major features of the Omnibus Housing Act of 1983. It permits (subject
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Thus, the simple withdrawal of a Mitchell-Lama rental project
from the program would not give rise to any great windfall to the
owner, at least while rent regulation exists in its present form. The
owner of a Mitchell-Lama rental project, however, could profit sub-
stantially from a buyout if the project's location lends itself to conver-
sion to a cooperative or condominium. There are now a significant
number of such conversion candidates among the Mitchell-Lama
housing stock in New York City. °3
Conversion of Mitchell-Lama rental'projects would be governed by
the same laws and regulations that apply to the cooperative or condo-
minium conversion of other rental property.1°4 Under these laws,
there is no bar to an owner exercising his buyout right and immedi-
ately proceeding with a cooperative or condominium conversion.
Furthermore, there is no legal obstacle to structuring this conver-
sion as an eviction plan.' Presumably, however, most project own-
ers, like the overwhelming majority of owners converting buildings in
New York City, would decide as a matter of business judgment to
proceed on a non-eviction basis.'0 6 Even the theoretical possibility of
to a complex set of limitations) rent increases to bring a property's net income up to five
percent of the gross rent roll. In a notable departure from the general practice of hard-
ship adjustments under the rent laws, it allows recognition of bona fide debt service as an
allowable cost item. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8626(d)(5), as added by 1983 N.Y. Laws
403 § 55-a at 740; NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-51 l(c)(6-a), as added by 1983
N.Y. Laws 403, § 49 at 735.
Application of either hardship formula to a property being withdrawn from the Mitch-
ell-Lama program would pose great difficulties. The "old" formula simply gives the
owner the dollar return he was earning two decades earlier, which was limited under the
Mitchell-Lama law to 6% of a very low equity. The "alternative" formula seeks to pro-
vide a meaningful return on present investment, based on present costs. However, the
two major items of present costs at issue-the liability for full taxes and the interest on
the money borrowed to pay off the Mitchell-Lama loan-were both voluntarily under-
taken as an incident to deregulation. Tenants may argue that any provision designed to
prevent owner hardship by passing through cost increases should not apply to a "self-
created" hardship-where the cost increases are the result of the owner's voluntary act.
The point has particular force in Mitchell-Lama buyouts, where the owner's action con-
sists of voluntary surrender of substantial government aid provided specifically to keep
rents down.
103. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
104. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-e, -eee, -eeee (McKinney 1984).
105. An eviction plan is one which
can result in the eviction- of a non-purchasing tenant by reason of the tenant
failing to purchase pursuant thereto, and which may not be declared effective
until at least [5 1%] of the bona fide tenants in occupancy of all dwelling units in
the ... development on the date the offering statement or prospectus was ac-
cepted for filing by the attorney general .. .shall have executed and delivered
written agreements to purchase ....
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(c) (McKinney 1984).
106. A non-eviction plan is one "which may not be declared effective until written
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an eviction plan, however, is likely to give rise to a substantial degree
of tenant anxiety. An eviction plan also raises a much sharper and
more immediate question of public policy: should the persons for
whom Mitchell-Lama housing was built lose their homes if they can-
not afford to buy?
2. Cooperatives and Condominiums: Application of the Martin Act
As a matter of law, a Mitchell-Lama cooperative has a right to
withdraw from the program after twenty years. 10 7 As noted above,
the statute makes no distinction, in any provision relevant to this is-
sue, between rentals and cooperatives.10 8 Moreover, neither the the
Mitchell-Lama law nor its legislative history offer any guidance in ap-
plying the buyout provisions to the special procedural problems in-
volved in converting Mitchell-Lama cooperatives to private
cooperatives."°9 Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent the Martin
purchase agreements have been executed and delivered for at least [15%] of all dwelling
units in the ... development by bona fide tenants in occupancy or bona fide purchasers
who represent that they intend . . .to occupy the unit when it becomes vacant." Id.
§ 352-eeee(b).
As one treatise has noted, "except under unusual circumstances, eviction plans involv-
ing buildings containing units that are subject to [tenant protection laws] are relatively
rare. In their place converters now resort to non-eviction plans .. " 4 E. MORRIS, NEW
YORK PRACTICE GUIDE: REAL ESTATE § 37-03(3)(b) (1986). In the first six months of
1989, in the five counties comprising New York City, 220 non-eviction plans for conver-
sions to cooperatives or condominiums were accepted for filing, as against only 24 evic-
tion plans. See tabulations of departmental figures in New York Co-op and Condo Insider,
May 1989, at 43; June 1989, at 44; July 1989, at 50; August 1989, at 52; September 1989,
at 52; October 1989, at 55.
Since a large portion of eviction plans are in very small buildings, the disparity in
number of apartments affected is even greater. For the first six months of 1989, the non-
eviction plans accepted for filing in New York City affected 14,499 apartments as against
549 apartments in eviction plans. Id. In particular, there have been virtually no attempts
to convert highly visible or well-known properties, such as Parkchester in the Bronx,
Lincoln Towers, Tudor City, London Terrace or Park West Village in Manhattan, on an
eviction basis. It seems safe to assume that the same course would be followed in any
Mitchell-Lama project, if only to avoid the extraordinary outcry that would result from
an eviction plan.
107. See supra notes 28-70 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. As in the case of rentals, the govern-
ment mortgage may be paid off, the real estate tax exemption surrendered, and the pro-
ject conveyed to a newly organized unregulated corporation owned by the previous
owners of the Mitchell-Lama company. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 35 (McKinney
1976).
109. The buyout provision applies to cooperatives simply as a result of a lack of limit-
ing language, rather than a specific intent one way or the other. This lack of focus on the
cooperatives is hardly surprising. Virtually no one in the late 1950s and early 1960s
could have envisioned a situation in which cooperative apartments in areas of New York
City far removed from the well-known "Gold Coast" neighborhoods would be the im-
mensely valuable assets they are today. The prospect of unit owners in a subsidized mid-
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Act," the set of complex laws and regulations governing the creation
of cooperatives and condominiums in New York, applies or should
apply to the conversion of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative from a gov-
ernmentally regulated entity to a private unregulated entity.
Application of the Martin Act to conversion of Mitchell-Lama
projects raises two issues: first, whether the Martin Act applies at all
to Mitchell-Lama conversions; and second, assuming it does, whether
the form of regulation now prescribed for ordinary cooperative con-
versions is workable or even appropriate in these transactions. These
issues are complicated by the fact that the drafters of the existing reg-
ulatory scheme, understandably, did not address the issue of the "con-
version" of a housing development which is already a cooperative.
a. Application of the Martin Act to Mitchell-Lama Conversions
In regulating cooperative conversions, the Martin Act is both a se-
curities law and a housing law. As a regulation of securities, the Act
applies only to an "offering," even though the term "security" is ex-
plicitly defined to include cooperative or condominium interests in
real property."' If reorganization of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative
into a non-regulated cooperative involved both the creation of a new
entity and the raising of additional equity, an "offering" would clearly
have taken place and the Martin Act would apply. If, however, reor-
ganization was accomplished by amending an existing corporate char-
ter, or by organizing a new company without the need for raising
additional equity, it is unlikely that an "offering" has taken place for
the purposes of the Act." 12
Viewed as a tenant protection law," 3 on the other hand, the Martin
Act should apply regardless of the form of the transaction. The New
die-income cooperative giving up their subsidy simply in order to free themselves of resale
price regulation would have been so remote as to be unlikely to occur to anyone drafting
or reviewing an amendment to the Mitchell-Lama law.
110. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352 to 359-h (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1989).
111. See N.Y. GEN Bus. LAW § 352-e(l)(a) (McKinney 1984). With respect to coop-
eratives, the Martin Act includes "cooperative interests in realty" in its definition of real
estate securities. Id. With respect to condominiums, the Condominium Act provides
that they "shall be deemed to be cooperative interests in realty within the meaning of [the
Martin Act]." REAL PROP. L. § 339-ee(l) (McKinney 1984).
112. Stated another way, the Martin Act does not regulate reorganizations or other
ongoing activities of existing corporations-cooperative or otherwise. To use an analogy
from federal law, the Martin Act is similar to the Securities Act of 1933, dealing with
disclosure and regulation in connection with the issuance of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-
aa (1976). The Martin Act does not, however, contain a regulatory system like that of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which imposes requirements on existing publicly-
held corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
113. The Martin Act has been amended to include several provisions to protect ten-
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York Attorney General has adopted this position and has asserted
jurisdiction under the statute over all such conversions.114
b. An Appropriate Regulatory Structure Under the Martin Act
The problem of applying the specific regulatory structure of the
Martin Act is more complex. There are three levels of regulation.
The first level is the basic language of the Martin Act regarding realty
offerings, which, as a part of a securities law rather than a housing
law, addresses primarily the protection of investors rather than home-
buyers." 5 The second level is a series of sections chiefly related to
tenant protection, 16 such as the right of rental tenants to purchase
their own apartments and the protections afforded against evictions.
The third level consists of the detailed regulations issued by the New
York Attorney General governing cooperative and condominium of-
ferings, particularly conversions, which include requirements for the
contents of an offering's prospectus."'
Each level of regulation contains material that is difficult to apply
to the reorganization of an existing government-regulated coopera-
tive. The extraordinarily detailed regulations now applicable" 8 do
not address, nor were they intended to address, a Mitchell-Lama-type
"conversion." If the legislature permits Mitchell-Lama cooperatives
to go through the buyout process, some substantial modifications of
the existing regulatory structure will be needed. The policy question
ants, such as affording tenants the right to purchase their own apartments and limiting
the possibility of eviction. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352e-eeee (McKinney 1984).
114. See text accompanying notes 62-63, requiring acceptance of an offering plan by
the Attorney General as a prerequisite to withdrawal of a Mitchell-Lama cooperative.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 1750.1-.7 (1988).
115. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(l)(b) (McKinney 1984) (describing re-
quirements of what information must be included in offering statement or prospectus).
116. The principal housing-related provisions are N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee
(governing three suburban counties), § 352-eeee (applicable to New York City). See also
§ 352-ee (providing disclosure and other protection to purchasers of units in loft and
other non-residential properties being converted to residential cooperatives or condomini-
ums). In addition, § 352-e itself, now contains various tenant protection provisions. Sec-
tion 352-e(2) in effect extends one element of the special regulatory scheme governing
New York City and its suburbs to the rest of New York State. It grants localities author-
ity to protect non-purchasing elderly or disabled tenants from eviction. See also id.
§ 352-e(2-a) (regarding payments of legal fees of tenant associations).
117. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, §§ 17.1-23.9 (1988). The most familiar
and most directly applicable of these regulations is part 18, which governs the offering of
interests in a cooperative if "one or more individuals reside[s] in the building" prior to the
offering, i.e., conversions of occupied residential. Id. § 18.1 (a)(l).
118. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, part 18, in the booklet form issued by the
Attorney General, spans over 100 single-spaced pages. Over half of its length is devoted
to a point-by-point specification of the contents of the offering plan.
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raised is whether the goals of disclosure and protection of the present
residents will best be met by forcing such a transaction into a mold
into which it does not fit. The best approach would be a separate
section of law assuring full disclosure, requiring majority or super-
majority consent, protecting those unable to afford any additional eq-
uity that might be required as a result of a buyout, and yet not impos-
ing requirements developed for a completely different kind of
transaction.
III. Constitutional Questions
Any governmental action to eliminate or substantially restrict
Mitchell-Lama's twenty-year prepayment provision is likely to impli-
cate at least two constitutional concerns. First, legislative repeal or
modification of the statutory prepayment right, part of the induce-
ment for investors to enter the program, may constitute a breach of
contract between the state and the owner and could thus violate the
contract clause of the United States Constitution." 9 Second, the
state's requirement that owners continue to make their projects avail-
able for a substantial additional period to members of a specific in-
come group arguably constitutes a violation of the fifth amendment's
takings clause: 1E0 the state "takes" the property for "public use" with-
out providing "just compensation" to the Mitchell-Lama project
owner.
A. The Contract Clause
In order to establish that modification of the buyout provision is a
violation of the contract clause, the Mitchell-Lama owners must
show: (1) that the Mitchell-Lama law constitutes a contract between
the state and the owners;' 2 ' (2) that such a modification is an "impair-
ment" of that contract; 22 and (3) that the impairment is not permit-
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This section states in pertinent part that "[n]o State
shall ...pass any . . .[f]aw impairing the [o]bligation of [contracts] ...." Id.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that
"[n]o person shall be... deprived of... property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
121. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977). The contract
clause is only triggered when there is evidence of a contract. A statute "may contain
provisions, which when accepted as the basis of action by individuals, become contracts
between them and the state" and consequently subject to the contract clause. State of
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938). In the case of legislative
enactments, a contract is created "when the language and circumstances evince a legisla-
tive intent to create private rights of a contractual nature." United States Trust Co., 431
U.S. at 17 n.14.
122. 431 U.S. at 17 n.14. In order for an action to succeed under the contract clause,
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ted under the contract clause of the Constitution. 23
1. Mitchell-Lama as a Contract
Current case law suggests that there is considerable reason to doubt
whether the prepayment provisions of the Mitchell-Lama law, how-
ever much they may have induced developers to join the program,
constitute a contract between the state and the Mitchell-Lama own-
ers.' z4 In the absence of explicit statutory language creating a con-
tract, the Supreme Court has generally not recognized a contractual
obligation between a state and a private entity arising out of a
statute. 125
The Mitchell-Lama law does not contain such explicit contractual
language. The buyout clause, which provides that the company "may
subsequent legislative or regulatory action must have impaired the contract. Id. A con-
tract is impaired by legislative or regulatory action when it decreases the value of a public
contract. See id. at 18-21.
123. Id. at 21. According to the Supreme Court, not every impairment of a public
contract violates the contract clause. Id. As the Court stated in Home Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), "the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not
to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula." Id. at 428. Consequently,
a court must analyze whether the particular impairment is unconstitutional.
This part of the contract clause analysis is by far the most involved. Initially, it must
be determined whether the obligation of the state is one which falls "within the reserved
powers which can not be contracted away." United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 23-25.
The two principal reserved powers cited by the courts as permitting impairment of public
contracts are the power of eminent domain and the police power. Id. at 24. As a general
rule, laws and regulations which can be construed as an exercise of either of these powers
are upheld as long as they are reasonable. Id. at 24-25. Cases, however, which involve a
financial obligation of the government do not automatically fall within a reserved power,
and therefore must meet the standard of "reasonable and necessary to serve an important
public purpose." Id. at 25.
124. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 470
U.S. 451 (1985). Cf United States Trust Co., 314 U.S. at 1.
125. See Atchison, 470 U.S. at 451. The Supreme Court in Atchison rejected the con-
tention that the statute that created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Am-
trak), and that the prescribed financial relations between it and the railroads whose
passenger service it was to take over was a contract between the government and the
railroads. The Court stated the governing doctrine as follows:
[flor many decades, this Court has maintained that absent some clear indication
that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that
,a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely
declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.'
This well-established presumption is grounded in the elementary proposition
that the principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make
laws that establish the policy of the state. Policies, unlike contracts, are inher-
ently subject to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the
obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drasti-
cally the essential powers of a legislative body. Thus, the party asserting the
creation of a contract must overcome this well-founded presumption.
470 U.S. at 465-66 (citations omitted).
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voluntarily be dissolved, without the consent" of the regulatory body,
after twenty years,' 26 is no more contractual in substance than any
other statutory provision which provides that a party "may" perform
a certain act.
The buyout clause may be contrasted with statutory provisions
dealing with the issuance of government bonds, which explicitly "cov-
enant" that the government will take (or refrain from taking) certain
actions, in order to protect bondholders. Courts have recognized that
these provisions create a contractual obligation between the state and
its bondholders.' 27 Similar explicit covenants for the benefit of bond-
holders are common in statutes authorizing government or agency
debt. The most relevant example, found in the Private Housing Fi-
nance Law immediately following provisions of the Mitchell-Lama
law, is the act creating New York State's Housing Finance Agency
(HFA). 128  After authorizing HFA debt, the statute explicitly pro-
vides that the state "does hereby pledge to and agree with the holders
of any notes or bonds issued under this article" that their rights will
not be impaired. 129  Furthermore, the state explicitly "covenants"
with HFA bondholders "in consideration of the acceptance of and
payment for the notes and bonds" that the HFA and its notes and
bonds will remain exempt from taxation.13
0
The HFA Act is particularly relevant as a comparison to the
Mitchell-Lama Law, since it concerns the same subject matter and
was in fact enacted originally for the purpose of financing Mitchell-
Lama housing.131 Its language clearly illustrates that the legislature is
126. See N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 35(2)-(3) (McKinney 1976).
127. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). United States Trust
Co. is one of the few modern cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated a statute as an
impairment of a government's contractual obligation. New York and New Jersey, in
connection with the establishment of a Port Authority commuter rail subsidiary, enacted
strict limits on the Authority's future involvement with deficit mass transit operations,
and embodied this limitation in the statute in words of covenant with bondholders. See
id. at 10. The Court held that subsequent repeal of this limitation was unconstitutional,
at least as to bond issues which took place while the covenant was law.
The Atchison Court, citing United States Trust Co., relied on the difference between
language explicitly creating a contract (such as "covenant") and other statutory language
in determining when a contract is created for contract clause purposes. The Atchison
Court noted the presence of language of covenant in the laws at issue in United States
Trust Co., and found the absence of such language significant in finding that no contract
existed in the case before it. Atchison, 470 U.S. at 469-70.
128. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 40-62 (McKinney 1976).
129. Id. The law authorizes HFA "to include this pledge and agreement of the state in
any agreement with the holders of such notes or bonds." Id.
130. Id. § 54.
131. See generally supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text. See also Message of the
Governor, Middle Income Housing Loans, 1959 N.Y. Laws 1764.
1989]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVII
capable of explicitly creating a contractual obligation when it wishes
to do so. Thus, regardless of how much a change would upset the
expectations of those who entered the program, the HFA Act fur-
nishes a strong argument against reading the buyout provision as a
legally enforceable contract between New York State and Mitchell-
Lama owners.1
32
2. Impairment
If the courts do find that the Mitchell-Lama buyout provisions con-
stitute a contract, the next question is whether or not the contract has
been "impaired" under the Constitution. The law on this issue, and
on the related question of whether an impairment is unconstitutional,
is far from clear. 133
The most accepted case of an unconstitutional impairment of con-
132. Another analogy to the Mitchell-Lama buyout provision exists in what has come
to be known as a "moral obligation" bond. The New York State Constitution imposes
'the same limits on state-guaranteed debt as on direct state debt: "[t]he credit of the state
[may not] be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, or public or private corpora-
tion or association .. " N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1). Various exceptions are provided
in this section and elsewhere in the constitution. If a proposed loan of the state's credit-
i.e., the placing of its credit behind a private or agency borrowing, such as by providing a
guarantee-does not fall within one of these exceptions, it would require a constitutional
amendment, which must be approved by voter referendum after approval by two sepa-
rately-elected legislatures. Id. Thus, the purpose of creating an agency like the HFA is
to permit bonds for self-sustaining projects to be issued outside of these restrictions.
The need for some additional security to lenders, in the form of state backing not
amounting to a guarantee, led to the development of the "moral obligation" device.
Under this scheme, a reserve fund is set up by the agency to secure payment of debt
service. If this fund falls below the amount prescribed by the statute (the maximum
principal and interest required to be paid, under existing bonds, in any one future year),
the agency certifies the shortfall to the Governor and the budget director. Then, the
amount needed to restore the funds "shall be apportioned and paid to the agency during
the then current state fiscal year." N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 47(l)(d) (McKinney
1976).
A contractual obligation to stand behind the HFA bonds would be an unconstitutional
guarantee under the New York Constitution. Accordingly, this language, despite its
mandatory phrasing, does not create-and is specifically designed not to create-a con-
tract. The state is expected to back up the bonds. In fact, it has never failed to honor its
obligations under these clauses when shortfalls have arisen. This duty to repay, however,
is not legally enforceable-it is a moral obligation.
The HFA "moral obligation" language surely sounds more like a contract than does
the Mitchell-Lama buyout provision. Yet the former is clearly not a contract; it is diffi-
cult, then, to see how the latter can be held to create enforceable contracts. The state
may well commit a breach of faith if it now eliminates 20-year buyouts, but this is quite
different from a legally cognizable breach of contract.
133. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating change
in Port Authority bond covenant legislation); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497,
516-17 (1965) (upholding change in land grant procedures cutting off originally unlimited
right of buyers to redeem their defaults and reclaim land).
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tract by a state is where a statute denies or delays payments that it has
promised to its citizens. Thus, in Flushing National Bank v. Munici-
pal Assistance Corp., I3 the New York Court of Appeals had no diffi-
culty in striking down a temporary moratorium on payment of certain
New York City notes enacted in response to the fiscal crisis of the
mid-1970s. 35 The Flushing decision was grounded in the require-
ment of the New York State Constitution that municipal debt be
backed by the "full faith and credit" of New York City.' 36 This "full
faith and credit" requirement was held to bar the legislature from
temporarily relieving New York City of its payment obligation.137
Although the Flushing decision was not based on the federal Consti-
tution, the court's approach and the opinion make it clear that the
state's actions would have been considered an unconstitutional im-
pairment of contract if it had been necessary to reach that issue. 3 '
The policy considerations underlying the Flushing decision, how-
ever, are distinguishable from those in the Mitchell-Lama buyout sce-
nario. In Flushing, the state was the debtor, and the temporary
moratorium weakened the position of its creditors."' Under the
Mitchell-Lama program, the roles are reversed: the government is the
lender, and a modification of the twenty-year moratorium would pre-
vent the debtor from making a prepayment to the government. There
appears to be no case law directly addressing the issue of impairment
of contract in this rather unusual circumstance.
The federal government is currently confronting the same issue as
that facing the state government in regard to the Mitchell-Lama pro-
gram. 1' Under various federal housing programs, the owners of
housing projects have a right to prepay their mortgages after twenty
years and become free of governmental regulation. 'W The Congres-
134. 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
135. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d
848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
136. See Flushing, 40 N.Y.2d 731, 740, 358 N.E.2d 848, 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 29.
137. See N.Y. Const., art VIII, § 2: ''[n]o indebtedness shall be contracted by any
county, city, town, village or school district unless such county, city, town, village or
school district shall have pledged its faith and credit for the payment of the principal
thereof and the interest thereon."
138. See Flushing, 40 N.Y.2d 731, 740, 358 N.E.2d 848, 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 29.
Similarly, legislation potentially undercutting a public agency's financial strength in a
fashion inconsistent with promises made to bondholders (even where the new law does
not by its terms purport to require or permit a delay in payment) has been struck down.
See, e.g., United States Trust CO., 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
139. See Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 738, 358
N.E.2d 848, 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 27 (1976).
140. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
141. Id.
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sional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress examined
this issue last year at the request of the Senate subcommittee consider-
ing buyout moratorium legislation.'42 Noting the broad scope of the
legislative police power and the reluctance of courts to expand con-
tract rights as a limit on this power, the memorandum suggested that
congressional restrictions on existing prepayment rights "would likely
be upheld if plausibly related to a broad public interest."' 43
The contracts clause of the federal Constitution limits only state
legislative impairment of contracts. 44 Interestingly, although the
contracts clause would not directly apply, the CRS memorandum also
considered the validity of a prepayment moratorium under the stan-
dard applied to state impairment of contracts. 45 Its conclusion on
this issue was considerably more tentative: "it would thus appear that
... [such changes] may be arguably constitutional even if the reason-
able and necessary standard applicable to state impairment of state
contracts were applied."' 146
The federal legislation addressing this issue has essentially imposed
a moratorium on project buyouts under certain programs unless it can
be shown that the housing in question would remain affordable.' 4 1
This legislation was upheld by one federal court, 4 s after the court
rejected challenges to the legislation's constitutionality and the stat-
ute's retroactive applicability in the particular circumstances of the
case. 1
49
142. Swendiman, Legal Analysis of Proposed Legislative Restrictions on Prepayment
Provisions in Existing Mortgage Contracts Under Federal Housing Programs, Congres-
sional Research Service, American Law Division (Sept. 28, 1987) [hereinafter CRS
Memorandum].
143. Id. at 8.
144. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. This restriction, however, does not apply to the fed-
eral government. Congressional action impairing a contract right would be invalid only if
the restriction amounted to a deprivation of property without due process, or a taking
without just compensation. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. CRS Memorandum, supra note 142, at 6-8.
146. CRS Memorandum, supra note 142, at 10.
147. Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-242, 101
Stat. 1877-1891.
148. See also Orrego v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 701 F. Supp.
1384, 1388 (N.D. I11. 1988).
149. Congress had placed a November 1, 1987 effective date on the provisions in a bill
that was not signed into law until February 5, 1988, although its existence and progress
were surely well-known to the industry. The project in question would have been eligible
for prepayment in early January, and the owners sought to prepay at that time. Interest-
ingly, the federal agency involved agreed with the owners that the provision was not to be
applied retroactively. The court, in deciding a class action suit brought by affected ten-
ants, rejected the agency's determination as inconsistent with clear statutory language,
and upheld the legislation, including its retroactive effect. See Orrego, 701 F. Supp. at
1396-98.
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B. Taking Without Compensation
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the government from "taking" private property for public use without
paying the owner just compensation. 50 Arguably, a modification or
elimination of the Mitchell-Lama buyout provision by the New York
State legislature would violate the takings clause.
The takings clause applies to actual appropriation of property by
the government for some public use, i.e., the eminent domain power,
but the Supreme Court has held that it is also possible for a state to
violate the takings clause without completely confiscating property. 15'
A compensable taking can occur when the government merely regu-
lates an owner's use of his property in such a way that the owner is
required to put it to a certain use, or to make it available to others.5 2
Thus, any authorization of a physical intrusion into property by an-
other-even to the extent of requiring an apartment house owner to
let a cable television company run wires into the building-is a tak-
ing. 53 Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently held that a Califor-
nia agency had committed a taking by conditioning a building permit
on the requirement that an owner of coastal property grant a right of
way to the public along the beach front. The Court relied heavily on
the fact that the owner was not merely being subjected to regulation
but was required to give others an easement through his land.'54
In each of these instances, the public purpose to be served by the
regulation was valid, and the government had a legitimate, and, per-
haps, compelling concern for making or keeping the property in ques-
tion available for a particular use. However, the takings clause is
intended to ensure that public needs should be financed through the
public treasury, rather than imposing the burden on whomever hap-
pens to own the property in question. The importance of dedicating
certain property to a particular use does not permit the government
to avoid paying a judicially determined "just compensation" to the
owner.
The Supreme Court has not clearly defined at what point regula-
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision applies to the states through the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.
151. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
152. Id.
153. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982).
Similarly, the use of air space as a flight path, although generally lawful, can be a taking if
it significantly interferes with the owner's enjoyment of the land below. See Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
154. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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tory control over property goes beyond permissible state "police
power" and becomes a "taking."' 5 5 New York State court decisions
on this issue also have been ambiguous.' 56 A federal district court
recently held that restricting buyout rights under a federal program
similar to Mitchell-Lama' 57 was not a taking.'58 As noted above,
owners were given the right to buy out their buildings after twenty
years, but legislation required that owners desiring to prepay their
mortgages must first show that low-income tenants would not be un-
duly burdened if the buyout took place.' 59 The court noted that "ex-
cept for the expected ability to prepay and raise rents, [the owners]
retain[ed] the same legal status as before."'' 60 Thus, the owners had
not been unconstitutionally deprived of a property right. The Emer-
gency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, however, imposed only
a two-year moratorium on buyouts pending development of a more
long term solution. The Court's reasoning may not be so persuasive if
simply locking owners into the program becomes the long term
solution.
In the Mitchell-Lama context, owners could contend that New
York State, by deciding that a project is to be targeted to a certain
population group, and regulated accordingly for a substantial period
of years beyond the current buyout period, has "taken" an interest in
the project for that term of years. Even if public need justifies the
"taking," the state cannot impose this change without compensation
to the owner. 16 1
155. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness.: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1167 (1967); Sax, Takings, Pri-
vate Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149 (1971). A series of notable Supreme
Court decisions late in the 1986-87 term suggests a closer and more critical scrutiny of
government action in this area, but seems to do little to resolve the confusion. See, e.g.,
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987). The full impact of these decisions is not clear.
156. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316
N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) (preservation of building as landmark not a taking
where preservation does not prevent all use of property for owner's purposes); Fred F.
French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 597, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, 10-11 (1976) (requiring preservation of park area within a private develop-
ment is a taking when rezoning bars any other use); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977) (requiring preser-
vation of landmark not a taking).
157. National Housing Act, § 221(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1982).
158. Orrego v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 701 F. Supp. 1384, 1396
(N.D. Il1. 1988).
159. Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-242,
§ 225, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988).
160. Orrego, 701 F. Supp. at 1396.
161. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). As Justice Holmes
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The basis for this contention derives both from the inherent nature
of the "takings" doctrine and from the approach of the Supreme
Court in the recent cases noted above in which the Court found tak-
ings where government mandated the intrusion on property for a
cable television connection, and where a scenic easement was man-
dated as a condition for construction on the coastline.
According to this argument, a distinction would be made between
regulation, however stringent, which merely tells an owner what he
may not do, 16 2 and a law putting an affirmative obligation upon an
owner to make his property available for a purpose which serves the
public good. The former may perhaps constitute a taking, but only if
the regulation becomes confiscatory; the latter is, however, per se a
taking. Such a per se taking is presumptively invalid. 63
This line of argument has very recently been given strong support
by the New York State Court of Appeals in Seawall Associates v. City
of New York,' 64 invalidating New York City's legislation which
sought to require owners of single-room-occupancy (SRO) housing
not only to preserve the units for that use but to rent out (as SROs)
those being held off the market or those which become vacant in the
future. The sharp loss of affordable SRO-type housing units (partly as
a result of tax benefits to encourage conversion to "standard" hous-
ing), and the appearance of many former SRO residents among the
ranks of the homeless, led to a series of measures: eliminating the
benefits awarded in connection with conversion of SROs, prohibiting
many such conversions outright, and finally, affirmatively requiring
that vacant SRO units be rehabilitated if needed and rented out-thus
even denying owners the right to "warehouse" the units in hopes of a
change in the law.' 65
The Court of Appeals, in its 5-2 decision striking down the most
recent enactment, focused on this last provision requiring owners to
rent out vacant units as SROs. The court accepted the owners' argu-
ment that the law "has resulted in a physical occupation of their
stated, when the police power is not involved, no matter how small the private property
interest, and no matter how great the public need, "the Fifth Amendment ... provides
that it shall not be taken for such [public] use without just compensation." Id. at 415.
162. For instance, zoning regulations, which are a form of negative obligations, are
often upheld as constitutional under the police power. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). More recently, the landmark laws have been up-
held. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
163. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
164. Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1989) (No. 89-
552).
165. Id. at 99-101, 542 N.E.2d at 1060-62, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 543-45.
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properties [by others] and is, therefore, a per se compensable tak-
ing. '  The decision cited recent Supreme Court decisions, particu-
larly Loretto v. Telemprompter Manhattan CA TV, 6 7 supporting the
view that if the government requires an owner to accept actual physi-
cal occupation of any part of his property for a public purpose, a com-
pensable taking has occurred. 68
The majority in Seawall rejected the suggestion of the dissenters
that its decision could lead to undermining the constitutionality of the
rent control laws and other regulations imposing severe restrictions
on owners' rights to manage their own property. 69 Characterizing
the SRO law as one which "forc[es] plaintiffs to rent their properties
to strangers,"' 0 the majority opinion drew a distinction between "re-
strictions [such as rent control laws or provisions for non-eviction co-
operative conversions] imposed on existing tenancies where the land-
lords had voluntarily put their properties to use for residential hous-
ing"'' and a law designed to "force the owners, in the first instance,
to subject their properties to a use which they neither planned nor
desired."' 2 The decision also found the local law at issue to be an
impermissible uncompensated regulatory taking, because the interfer-
ence with the rights of ownership was so extreme. 73
Most significant in the context of Mitchell-Lama is the court's de-
termination of "physical taking." Under present law, Mitchell-Lama
owners who buy out have the right-subject to all of the rent laws and
other restrictions applicable to housing generally-to rent apartments
as they see fit, convert them, or not rent them at all pending a decision
as to their future use.' 74 A substantial deferral or elimination of the
buyout right would require them to continue to rent these apartments
to members of a defined population group, at specially regulated
rents, and under a detailed regulatory system.
This requirement would be motivated by a need to preserve the in-
adequate supply of affordable housing. 7  But if governmentally-im-
166. See id. at 102-06, 542 N.E.2d at 1060-65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 545-48.
167. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
168. Id. at 427; Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 102, 542 N.E.2d at 1062, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
169. See Seawall, 74 N.Y.2d at 112 n.ll, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551
n.ll.
170. Seawall, 74 N.Y.S.2d at 105, 542 N.E.2d at 1064, 544 N.Y.2d at 547.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 70-118 and accompanying text.
175. See Governor's Program Bill No. 30 (1989). The statement in support of the
proposed bill to limit Mitchell-Lama buyouts states that "there is currently a shortage of
safe, decent and affordable housing" and that legislative inaction "will exacerbate a grow-
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posed requirements to rent out SROs are invalid, even where the fate
of the poorest and most dependent population groups is at stake and
even in the face of a severe homelessness crisis, can such requirements
be sustained in the interest of preserving middle-income units?
The New York Court of Appeals, if it adheres to its view in Seawall
Associates, may well answer "no" to such a question. A change in the
rules on buyouts could easily be viewed (as was the New York City
SRO moratorium) as an invalid attempt to "force individual property
owners to bear more than a just share of obligations which are right-
fully those of society at large."' 17 6
Apparently, the takings argument has not been raised by any party
involved in the Mitchell-Lama dispute. However, if there is a consti-
tutional argument against restricting buyouts, the strongest ground is
the takings clause. But regardless of the ultimate result of any consti-
tutional challenge, there are significant public policy considerations
which should make the New York State legislature hesitate before
creating a sweeping change in the Mitchell-Lama law.
IV. Policy Considerations
Assuming that the legislature can modify the buyout provision
without violating the Constitution, it must determine what action, if
any, to take. The policy questions involved in this decision are nu-
merous, particularly in the case of rental projects, and there are sub-
stantial arguments in favor of every party's interests. Here again, it is
necessary to analyze rental and cooperative projects separately.
A. Rental Projects
The sponsors of post-1959 Mitchell-Lama developments entered
the program under a set of rules that permitted withdrawal after a
stated period. 77 Those in favor of the present buyout scheme argue
that the government should permit owners to exercise their buyout
rights in fairness to those who were induced by that provision to de-
velop Mitchell-Lama projects. Proponents of the current buyout pro-
vision also argue that changing the rules this late in the program's life
would cause potential investors to lose faith in the government's abil-
ity to keep its promises, thus creating a disincentive to private devel-
ing homeless problem." Id. See also N.Y. Times, July 6, 1988, at B3, cols. 1-2; Walsh,
supra note 1, at 13.
176. Seawall Assocs. v. New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 101, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1062, 544
N.Y.S.2d 542, 545 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1989) (No.
89-552).
177. See supra notes 41-70 and accompanying text.
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opers to participate in future housing programs.17 8
The real estate industry unsuccessfully made similar arguments
when rent regulation was extended to housing built when new con-
struction was not regulated. 79 Owners claimed that they developed
new housing only on the understanding that it would not be regu-
lated. The legislature was not persuaded by the prediction that break-
ing this "promise," as it was characterized, would prevent owners
from trusting the government in the future.18 0
Mitchell-Lama developers, however, appear to have a stronger ar-
gument than the opponents of rent stabilization, for two reasons.
First, although the twenty-year buyout provision was not part of a
formal contract, it was part of a package of inducements given to de-
velopers in order to draw the private sector into the program.'"'
Those who chose to develop a Mitchell-Lama project entered into a
governmental program based on a series of ground rules. By contrast,
in the case of housing not subject to the rent laws when built, there
was no special relationship originally established between the govern-
ment and the owner. The owner simply proceeded to build under the
laws generally applicable to rental housing in effect at the time, and
later had to change his course of conduct in order to comply with the
change in that general body of law.
Second, the government usually "changes the rules" by a general
amendment to the applicable law. For example, the legislature deter-
mines that existing housing should be rent-regulated or have smoke
detectors. A builder who did not contemplate these rules when he
chose to build may now be worse off, but only as a result of a general
exercise of the legislative power which affects every builder in the in-
dustry. Thus, no one group of builders is singled out.
In the case of Mitchell-Lama, however, amending the buyout provi-
sion would withdraw a right which was explicitly conferred by law on
a defined group. Although preservation of the Mitchell-Lama
projects is arguably an important public interest, the legislature must
178. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1988, at B3, col. 1.
179. The New York City rent control law applies only to prewar housing. The Rent
Stabilization Law of 1969 (New York City Local Law No. 10 of 1969) placed buildings
built after the war that had six or more apartments under rent regulation, but post 1969
construction continued to be exempt. The ETPA, as an incidental revision to rent stabili-
zation, brought buildings constructed between 1969 and 1974 under its scope.
180. See Message From the Governor, Middle Income Housing Loans, 1959 N.Y.
Laws at 1764; Bill Jacket for 1959 N.Y. Laws 675.
181. See generally supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. See also Walsh, supra
note 1, at 13-14.
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address the question of fairness when imposing the burden on one
particular group whose rights were established by the original statute.
The argument in favor of restricting buyouts focuses on the need to
preserve middle-income housing. The Mitchell-Lama projects are an
important housing resource for those who cannot afford convention-
ally financed housing. In particular, they are a major source of afford-
able family-sized units, which are extremely scarce in many portions
of New York and which the private sector cannot readily produce.' 8 2
Replacing any major portion of this housing with new middle-income
units would entail enormous costs-far beyond those incurred in
building the projects two or more decades ago-at a time when state
and municipal resources are strained and when the drastic federal cut-
backs of recent years have sharply reduced the major source of fund-
ing available for any such program. 183
On balance, assuming that the buyout can be carried out without
adversely affecting existing tenants, the arguments favoring the
buyout right, in the case of rental projects, appear more persuasive.
B. Cooperative Projects
The situation with respect to Mitchell-Lama cooperatives is some-
what different. The arguments for keeping units within the program
are similar to those that apply to rental developments. The argu-
ments for permitting withdrawal from regulation, however, are far
weaker.
In the case of rentals, the argument for leaving the existing buyout
provision intact rests on the notion that the government should re-
spect the legitimate expectations of those who entered the program.
The argument may be expressed in terms of fairness, sanctity of con-
tract, or simply as a fear of deterring future private participation in
housing programs. This argument, however, does not really apply to
cooperatives. Residents of Mitchell-Lama cooperatives did not come
into the program in order to make future profits by taking the projects
private. They did so in order to obtain housing at reasonable costs.
In addition, cooperative owners, unlike the rental project owners,
have been the direct beneficiaries of the Mitchell-Lama aid provided
over the years. In contrast, the developer of a rental project is, in a
sense, analogous to the builder under a government contract. He is
182. See N.Y. Times, July 6, 1988 at B3, col. 3.
183. See, e.g., Introduction, Housing & Community Development Act of 1987
§ 202(a)(7), 101 Stat. 1877 (1987) (acknowledging in legislative finding of Emergency
Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 that program cutbacks contributed to
housing shortage).
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"paid" in the form of the Mitchell-Lama subsidies for doing a job for
the government-creating affordable housing. The program's limits
on rents and profits cause the bulk of this "payment" to be passed
through to the intended beneficiaries-the rental tenants. A proposed
buyout in a rental project pits the owner's right to enter the private
market against the rights of present residents, those on waiting lists,
and the next generation of middle-income tenants to continued use of
the project. Present rental tenants, however, who have received the
benefits of Mitchell-Lama projects as long as they lived there, hardly
have the right to demand private-market profits in addition to these
benefits. The same argument should apply to cooperative tenant-
shareholders.
Cooperative tenant-shareholders in Mitchell-Lama projects chose
their housing for the same reason as did tenants in Mitchell-Lama
rental projects-because it offered far more for the money than the
private sector could provide. These shareholders, like renters, receive
the benefits of the subsidy program each month when they pay low
maintenance as a result of the governmental benefits given to the pro-
ject. The cooperative owners in the typical Mitchell-Lama project,
therefore, are more closely analogous to renters than to private sector
cooperative owners. '8s4
The cooperative projects are regulated in minute detail by the state
or-the city, under provisions substantially identical to those governing
rental projects.' 85 Mitchell-Lama cooperative residents often find
themselves being treated, and reacting, not like private sector tenant-
shareholders, but like rental tenants whose landlord happens to be
the government.
Mitchell-Lama cooperative residents may have a right to any profit
on resale that deregulation would bring when the subsidies, by their
own terms, expire. They may have some claim to a liberalization of
the resale formula, particularly if some portion of the proceeds are to
be used for public benefit. But they do not have a vested right to the
major immediate profits that may result from taking the project pri-
vate under the twenty-year buyout provision, and selling their apart-
ments at free market prices.
184. Generally, Mitchell-Lama cooperative owners' equity is 5% of a very low con-
struction cost, usually a few hundred dollars per room. See N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW
§ 12 (McKinney 1976).
185. The statute applies substantially all of its restrictions to all "projects" or "compa-
nies," distinguishing only in rare instances between rental and "mutual," or cooperative,
developments. See supra notes 3-15 and accompanying text.
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V. Alternative Solutions and Recommendations
A. Alternative Solutions
Several New York State housing programs other than Mitchell-
Lama have recently faced the consequences of termination of tax ben-
efits or other assistance and accompanying deregulation. In addition,
an early-buyout clause under several federal housing assistance pro-
grams is a subject of national controversy. The approaches which fol-
low, some of which have been used in these housing programs,
suggest different ways of dealing with the Mitchell-Lama situation.
1. Preservation of the Status Quo
The simplest possibility is to leave the present law unchanged and
permit buyouts to take place when market forces dictate. This would
permit, after twenty years, the deregulation that would take place in
any event a decade or two later upon the expiration of the tax exemp-
tion and the payoff (at the end of its full amortization schedule) of the
project loan.
State government regulation has been permitted to expire for hous-
ing built under the Limited Dividend Housing Companies Law
(LDHC). s6 This program, originally enacted in 1926, provided
assistance in the form of real estate tax exemptions but not govern-
ment mortgages.' 87 Although they lack built-in governmental financ-
ing, limited-dividend companies are similar to Mitchell-Lama
companies and operate under a very similar regulatory scheme.
Although tax exemptions under LDHC were provided for a period
of up to fifty years, by the late 1970s and early 1980s the exemptions
for the first generation of projects were expiring. At that point, the
individual projects were receiving no special subsidies, yet were sub-
ject to comprehensive state regulation. The law permitted deregula-
tion of cooperatives but not rentals. 88 The DHCR, after unsuccessful
attempts to amend the law and eliminate this restriction, permitted
certain rental projects to be taken private by an indirect route. This
was done by organizing a new company not subject to the Private
Housing Finance Law, conveying the project from the old company
186. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 70-97 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989).
187. The original projects, a number of which were developed under union auspices,
were financed privately. More recent projects used federally-insured mortgages or other
forms of federal assistance.
188. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 84(8) (McKinney 1976). This provision permits
DHCR to waive its regulatory powers over "mutual housing companies" (i.e., coopera-
tives) after the expiration of the tax exemption.
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to the new company, and then authorizing dissolution of the old
company.
2. Gradual Transition
Another approach is to provide a gradual transition to an unregu-
lated status. This approach was followed by the other major class of
New York regulated housing companies which predates Mitchell-
Lama: the redevelopment company.18 9
Redevelopment companies received assistance in the form of mu-
nicipal property tax exemptions, but did not receive governmental
assistance in financing the project costs. The Redevelopment Compa-
nies Law authorized tax exemptions for a period of up to twenty-five
years. Thus, in the early 1970s, when the tax exemptions for the ini-
tial projects were about to expire, the prospect of a sharp increase in
real estate taxes, coupled with the termination of government regula-
tion posed a threat to the continued ability of the projects to provide
affordable housing. 90
Separate legislative responses for rental projects and for coopera-
tives were developed. First, in 1972 the New York legislature author-
ized the conversion of rental redevelopment companies to
cooperatives. These cooperatives would then be eligible (at the discre-
tion of the municipality) for a twenty-five-year phase-out of the pro-
ject's tax exemption after its initial term, in lieu of an abrupt
transition to full taxpaying status. During this phase-out period, the
project was placed under the same income eligibility and surcharge
provisions as govern the Mitchell-Lama projects.' 9' In 1973, the
same provisions were made available to projects originally set up as
cooperatives. 192
Finally, the Real Property Tax Law was amended in 1974 to ex-
189. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 100-126 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989). The
New York Legislature enacted the predecessor of the redevelopment companies law in
1942 to facilitate the development by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of the
Stuyvesant Town project in Manhattan. 1942 N.Y. Laws 845. Provisions for Stuyvesant
Town and its special needs shaped the law, although it was later used for a wide variety of
other projects, both rentals and cooperatives.
190. Prior to the enactment of the ETPA in 1974, government-assisted housing emerg-
ing from regulations would not be subject to any rent limitations. Prior to 1974, the
regulatory scheme, supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text, did not exist.
191. 1972 N.Y. Laws 641 (codified at N.Y. PRiv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 125(l)(a), 126
(McKinney 1976)). The extension of tax benefits is limited to projects "which would
require substantial increases in carrying charges after the period of tax exemption is
ended unless relief is provided." This condition presumably would be met by virtually
any development facing an end of substantial tax exemptions.
192. 1973 N.Y. Laws 1017 (codified at N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 125(1)(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1976)).
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tend tax exemption for redevelopment companies for an additional
ten years on a gradually declining basis. 93 While the 1974 amend-
ment applies to all projects, its practical effect is largely limited to the
rental developments. 94 Rental projects receiving the benefits of the
1974 amendment are placed under the Rent Stabilization Law for the
life of the additional exemption period.
3. Permitting Buyouts But Protecting Present Tenants
Another possibile approach is to permit buyouts, while at the same
time protecting tenants presently living in the projects. This plan pre-
vents hardship to those most immediately affected, but accepts the
loss of the housing in question as units are vacated. Precedent for
such a plan exists in the treatment of units in New York's "421-a"
projects.
A large portion of the multi-family rental housing developed in
New York City since the early 1970s has received assistance in the
form of partial tax exemption under section 421-a of the Real Prop-
erty Tax Law. 9 The properties are placed under rent stabilization
for the life of the exemption-ten years under the initial program and
a longer period under later amendments for certain developments
outside Manhattan.
Three years after the program's 1971 enactment, the Emergency
Tenant Protection Act brought buildings built between 1969 and 1974
under rent stabilization. 96 Thus the first 421-a properties to come to
the end of their tax-exemption period remained under regulation.
When the ten-year tax exemptions for the first post-1974 projects
were about to expire, however, a major battle ensued. Owners in-
sisted that the arrangement under which the units were built contem-
plated deregulation at the end of the tax benefit period. They argued
that changing the rules amounted to breaching a contract. Tenants,
of course, were opposed to the loss of rent protection.
The legislative solution was a compromise under which pre-1974
projects remain regulated, while regulation ceases in later projects as
193. 1974 N.Y. Laws 941 (codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 423 (McKinney
1984)). This provision is self-executing for any project not receiving the phase-out bene-
fits under the redevelopment companies law.
194. Cooperative Redevelopment Companies can use the considerably more generous
25-year phase-out provisions of the 1972 and 1973 amendments to the law. Although
this benefit, unlike that provided under the 1974 law, is discretionary with the municipal-
ity, it seems unlikely that a locality would be unwilling to provide the benefit of gradual
transition to -fully-taxpaying status to a project to which it originally granted a tax
exemption.
195. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1984).
196. 1974 N.Y. Laws 576 § 4.
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each individual apartment is vacated. Existing tenants remain under
rent regulation unless their original lease gave clear warning of the
chance of loss of this status. 9
4. "Carrot and Stick" Approach
Another possible approach consists of adopting a combination of
restrictions on buyouts and incentives to stay in the program. Gover-
nor Cuomo's administration adopted this "carrot and stick" approach
in its 1987 program bill. The proposal prohibited deregulation at the
twenty-year point without governmental approval. The proposal also
permitted the projects in question to take advantage of a series of lib-
eralizations of the program which would have created, in effect, a
class of housing midway between Mitchell-Lama and the normal pri-
vate market.
5. Elimination of the Buyout Provision
The New York legislature could simply eliminate the twenty-year
buyout provision without significant liberalization of the existing
formula. This approach was followed in the Governor's 1988 legisla-
tive proposal. 9 ' This bill prohibits buyouts for the first thirty-five
years of the project mortgage. 199
A few small benefits were offered in the Governor's bill to projects
which stay in the program. Provisions for eviction of over-income
tenants (which have never been enforced in practice) would be re-
pealed in exchange for provisions for higher surcharge payments by
residents whose incomes substantially exceed the law's formulas. The
rate of return to rental project owners is increased from 6% to 8%.
In addition, there are provisions for distribution of project surpluses
to the owners.
The real estate industry, however, is probably correct in viewing
these changes as symbolic rather than substantive. An owner's equity
based on a twenty-year-old project cost minus a 90% mortgage is so
minimal that an increase in the rate of return is not meaningful. Fur-
thermore, the likelihood that the state or city would approve rent in-
creases to generate surpluses over this amount is not very great.
197. 1985 N.Y. Laws 288 § 3, ch. 289 (amending N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-
a(2)(f)(ii) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1989)).
198. Proposed "Mitchell-Lama Housing Preservation Act" (1988 New York Gover-
nor's Program Bill No. 164).
199. Id.
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6. Temporary Moratorium
It is possible to defer the problem by adopting a temporary morato-
rium on project buyouts. This may be accomplished either through a
simple freeze on the right to withdraw a project (perhaps accompa-
nied by provisions for a study looking toward a long-range solution),
or by a requirement that an owner seeking deregulation give ohe or
two years notice to tenants and to the regulatory agency.
The temporary moratorium approach has recently been adopted by
Congress in an attempt to deal with a controversy virtually identical
to the Mitchell-Lama issue." Several major federal housing assist-
ance programs provide a right to prepay and withdraw after twenty
years under terms strikingly similar to the Mitchell-Lama buyout pro-
visions.2"' Newly-enacted federal legislation imposes what amounts
to a two-year moratorium on buyouts from certain federal housing
projects, although permission is granted for deregulation where it can
200. See Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, enacted as Title
II of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-242, 101 Stat.
1877-1891. The principle provisions of the act are set out as notes to 12 U.S.C. § 17151
(1976 & Supp. 1989).
201. As in the case of the Mitchell-Lama law, the great surge of production under
these programs occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s. The programs in question provide
assistance to supplement the mortgage insurance programs of the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration under the National Housing Act in order to make the housing more afforda-
ble to moderate income tenants. They include provisions for below-market loan rates or
direct annual subsidies as a means to decrease the effective interest rate to as low as 1%.
12 U.S.C. §§ 17151(d)(3), 1715z-1 (1982).
Also at issue are contracts under the "section 8" program, which provides rent subsi-
dies to make privately owned housing available to the same population group served by
public housing at similar rents (originally 25%, now 30% of income). United States
Housing Act of 1937 § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (1982). Each of these programs is adminis-
tered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Analogous programs for rural housing, administered by the Farmers Home Administra-
tion of the Department of Agriculture, contain similar features. Title V of the Housing
Act of 1949, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1490h (1982). Projects compris-
ing hundreds of thousands of housing units will be eligible to withdraw from these pro-
grams, and hence from federally-imposed rent and income limits, in the next few years.
The legislative findings accompanying the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation
Act of 1987 describe estimated potential losses of more than 330,000 units under the
§ 221(d)(3) and § 236 programs over the next 15 years; more than 465,000 units under
the § 8 program over the next decade; and perhaps 150,000 units under § 515 of the
Housing Act of 1949, the principal subsidized portion of the Farmers Home Administra-
tion program. 1987 Act § 202(a)(1)-(3), 101 Stat. 1877.
The debate over the treatment of these projects is similar to that over the Mitchell-
Lama buyouts. Owners have insisted that the arrangements under which the projects
were developed constitute either a contract between them and the government or a moral
obligation of the latter which would be breached by prohibiting withdrawal from the
program. Advocates of preservation of the restrictions point not only to the plight of
the present tenants but also to the loss of housing resources that will result when aid for
new affordable housing is sharply curtailed.
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be done without harm to tenants or to the community.2 °z
A similar short-term moratorium could be imposed on Mitchell-
Lama projects by the New York State legislature. This approach
keeps housing within the program, while permitting a more rational
study of policy alternatives. Because this approach is less drastic and
allows the government a reasonable time to think of alternatives, it
seems less prone to constitutional challenge than either an outright
elimination of the buyout right, or a long-term deferral of permission
to exercise it, as in the Governor's current bill.
The problem with the moratorium proposal, however, is that it
only postpones the "day of reckoning." Indeed, when a two-year
freeze expires, the state would simply be confronted with a larger
problem since additional units will have reached the twenty-year
point. Moreover, the history of the legislative battles on this issue
does not indicate that a solution which is satisfactory to all parties is
likely to emerge in the interim.
B. Recommendations
Any resolution of the buyout issue must begin by recognizing that
the rental and cooperative projects pose radically different conceptual
and practical problems, and must be dealt with separately.
In the case of the rental projects, elimination of the twenty-year
buyout provision would constitute at least a breach of faith with the
202. See Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, 12 U.S.C. 1715!
(1976 & Supp. 1989). Over a two-year period, owners cannot buy out of certain federal
housing programs without approval of their plan by HUD. To grant such approval,
HUD must find that present tenants would not be harmed by the buyout. 1987 Act
§ 255, 101 Stat. at 1880. If the plan for withdrawal involves "termination of the low
income affordability restrictions" it can be approved only if HUD finds that it "would (a)
not create hardship for current tenants or displace them where comparable and affordable
housing is not readily available and (b) would not materially affect the general supply of
low income housing in the market area, lessen the ability of low income people to find
housing near job opportunities or reduce housing opportunities to minorities." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 122(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 196, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3317, 3493. The actual statutory language is to the same effect. 1987
Act § 225(a), 101 Stat. 1880. Alternatively, HUD can accept compliance with a state
program to preserve the project as affordable housing, under similar criteria. Id. § 226,
101 Stat. 1881.
Despite the two-year "sunset" clause on the new law's restrictive provisions, the indus-
try has already indicated a readiness to mount a substantial challenge to its constitutional
validity. In an attempt to forestall such litigation, the legislation contains an "alternative
prepayment moratorium" under which, if the provisions in question are invalidated by
any court, an absolute moratorium will be imposed on all prepayments of projects "lo-
cated in the geographic area subject to the jurisdiction of such court." Id. § 22 1(b), 101
Stat. 1879. It is likely that this provision itself will be challenged, and that the Congres-
sional battle over this issue has only just begun.
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project owners.2 °3 Regardless of the constitutional validity of any leg-
islative modification, 2° there is no doubt that the legislature held out
the right to prepay as a specific inducement to the private sector to
enter the program. Prepayment as of right was not permitted under
the original Mitchell-Lama law, 2 ' but rather was added by the gover-
nor and the legislature after the original law failed to attract signifi-
cant private-sector participation. 2°6  Thus, prepayment was not
merely one incidental element of a complex scheme, but a provision
specifically formulated as an incentive to potential participants. Con-
sequently, outright withdrawal or significant postponement of the
privilege, unaccompanied by significant liberalization of the rent re-
strictions under Which Mitchell-Lama companies operate, would be
unfair to rental project owners, and could drastically weaken the
state's credibility in dealing with the private sector in years to come.
The reduction in the state's credibility merits serious consideration,
since today nearly all new initiatives in New York State for the devel-
opment of affordable housing rely heavily on public-private partner-
ship.207 In the absence of the massive federal funding available a
decade or two ago, there is virtually no alternative to this approach.
A dramatic demonstration of New York's readiness to change retro-
actively the rules under which the private sector agreed to develop
housing could impair new programs to a degree that far outweighs the
benefits of keeping existing Mitchell-Lama projects in the program for
another ten to twenty years.
It is neither necessary nor appropriate, however, to leave the ex-
isting law intact. Some protection against serious adverse effects on
current rental residents is clearly required; the more difficult question
remains as to whether these units should be preserved as middle-in-
come housing beyond the tenancy of the present occupants. With
these considerations as background, some suggestions can be offered
for a legislative resolution of this issue.
First, with respect to the protection of rental tenants, existing rent
stabilization laws govern the majority of rental projects withdrawn
from the Mitchell-Lama program.20 8 However, Mitchell-Lama ten-
ants in areas of the state without rent stabilization would lose all rent
203. See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 122-82 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 34-53, 183-87 and accompanying text.
207. See generally supra notes 4, 183-87 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text. Although the majority of the
projects are located in municipalities, particularly New York City, which have adopted
the ETPA, some are not.
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and eviction protection as their leases expire following a buyout.
Some form of rental protection must be provided by law in these ar-
eas, at least for existing tenants.
Second, the Mitchell-Lama law has been supplemented by provi-
sions that make some apartments in these projects affordable to those
of lower income than the normal project rent would permit."0 9 These
existing rental assistance programs must be continued for residents of
the project despite its change in status. Indeed, owners who withdraw
from the program should be required, not merely permitted, to keep
the assistance in place in order to prevent hardship to the lowest-in-
come residents.
Third, cooperative or condominium conversion of a rental prop-
erty withdrawn from the Mitchell-Lama program 210 should be per-
mitted only on a non-eviction basis. Though an attempt to carry out
an eviction plan in any highly visible project is unlikely in practice,
eliminating the anxiety and polarization that even the possibility of
such a plan would cause justifies a ban on such conversions.
Fourth, assuming the tenant protections noted above are in place,
the twenty-year prepayment provision should be retained for existing
projects. Appropriate incentives, however, should be developed to
keep properties in the Mitchell-Lama program. These incentives
could include a meaningful liberalization of the rate of return, or a
reduction of the extremely detailed regulations currently in place.
Such changes might induce many project owners to remain within the
Mitchell-Lama law for the life of the mortgage rather than convert
their projects to rent-stabilized status.
In the case of cooperative projects, unlike rental projects, the pre-
payment-and-deregulation process is inherently inappropriate.
Mitchell-Lama cooperative buyers were induced to purchase by the
prospect of affordable housing, not resale profit.21' No promise is bro-
ken, nor legitimate expectation frustrated, by barring the present resi-
dents from turning their small initial equity2 12 into a profit, which in
209. Most notably, the so-called "capital grant" program, administered by DHCR
with funding through appropriations by the state to HFA, provides this financial assist-
ance. See N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 44-a (McKinney 1976). Originally, the subsidy
was provided by renting apartments in the name of HFA at the Mitchell-Lama project
rent, and subletting them to lower income tenants at lower rents, similar to those in
public housing. See id. § 44-a(1), (2). A 1981 amendment permitted granting the aid
more directly by making payments to the housing company in return for its accepting a
lower rent from certain low income tenants. See id. § 44-a(5) (as added by 1981 N.Y.
Laws 909).
210. See supra notes 102-18 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 185.
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some locations amounts to tens of thousands of dollars, at the expense
of withdrawal of the project from the affordable housing market.
Furthermore, if a cooperative project were to be allowed to with-
draw from the program, maintenance would necessarily rise sharply
as the governmental benefits-the tax exemption, and the low-interest
mortgage-expired. These costs would be born ultimately by the resi-
dents, since there is no separate "landlord" who would be required
under the rent laws to absorb the increases (and hence perhaps think
twice about leaving the program). In the cooperative, a sharp conflict
of interest would arise between those residents willing and able to pay
this cost in the expectation of profits upon resale and those who could
not afford it, as well as between those planning to move in the near
future and those viewing the project as a long range home. Conse-
quently, permitting buyouts-particularly in the absence of protec-
tions for the remaining residents-is inconsistent with the intent of
the Mitchell-Lama program, because, in effect, it would favor the
higher income tenants and those ready to cash in and move, as op-
posed to those who need continued affordable housing.
VI. Conclusion
The Mitchell-Lama prepayment issue, already affecting many
thousands of apartments, will be confronted by far more owners, rent-
ers, and cooperative shareholders in the next few years. Because of
the public interest in affordable housing, the preservation of the pres-
ent stock of such housing must be a major goal of any policy in this
area.
In developing a solution, the New York State legislature must view
the Mitchell-Lama debate not merely as a dispute between landlords
and tenants, but rather as an issue which affects the future preserva-
tion of a major public resource. Any solution must accommodate the
legitimate claims of the population group for which the Mitchell-
Lama projects were developed, in a fashion which is perceived to be
equitable by owners, so as not to discourage the private sector from
participating in future middle-income housing programs. Because the
dimension of the problem will increase sharply with each passing
year, the New York State legislature should move promptly to seek to
break the current deadlock over the issue.
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